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IMAGINING THE UNIMAGINABLE:
TORTURE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW

Francesca Laguardia*
ABSTRACT
This article examines use of torture by the U.S. government in the context
of the late 20th century preventive turn in criminal justice. Challenging the
assumption that the use of “enhanced interrogation tactics” in the war on terror
was an exceptional deviation from accepted norms, this article suggests that this
deviation began decades before the terror attacks, in the context of conventional
criminal procedure. I point to the use of the “ticking time bomb hypothetical,”
and its connection to criminal procedure’s “kidnapping hypothetical.” Using
case law and criminal procedure textbooks I trace the employment of that
narrative over several decades, prior to 2001, including growing support for the
use of physical brutality in obtaining information from criminal suspects. Far
from “unimaginable,” I argue that the use of torture had been imagined, and
gained increasing acceptance, in the increasingly preventive focus of these
standard criminal procedural debates.

I. INTRODUCTION
When the United States began detaining “enemy combatants” at the
Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility, it seemed to many that “the unthinkable had
become thinkable.”1 Civil and human rights advocates decried the policy as a
radical departure from both human rights norms and prior U.S. practice. 2 The
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Assistant Professor, Justice Studies, Montclair State University. J.D. 2007, Ph.D.
2012, Institute for Law and Society, New York University. Former Director of Research, Center
on Law and Security at NYU School of Law. The author is extremely grateful to Stephen
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also specifically like to thank Ryan Gander and the staff of the Columbia Human Rights Law
Review for their hard work and dedication to this article.
1.
Jeremy Waldron, Torture Terror and Tradeoffs: Philosophy for the Whitehouse 222
(2010); David Luban, Unthinking the Ticking Time Bomb, in Global Basic Rights 181 (Charles
Beitz & Robert Goodin eds., 2009).
2.
See, e.g., Jane Mayer, The Dark Side: The Inside Story of How the War on Terror
Turned into a War on American Ideals (2008) (discussing the legal and political underpinnings
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revelation that the United States was engaging in torture, by CIA agents and via
the intelligence services of proxy countries, served only to heighten the tenor of
the criticism.3 The controversy has since returned to the forefront of the U.S.
policy debate with the release of the declassified executive summary of the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence report on the use of torture by the CIA. 4
However, some scholars have challenged the notion that the “new”
counterterrorism practices were such a complete departure from the “old”
counterterrorism regime. Some pointed to the history of indefinite detention of
immigrants,5 while others argued that the new policies were merely reflections of
the increase in punitive policies that had begun in the 1970s. 6 Still more noted
changes within American criminal justice policies, arguing that U.S. military and
criminal justice policies were converging on a single system of justice that
embraced certain War on Terror practices.7
The individual developments noted in the studies above were either
presented without reference to broader criminal justice developments 8 or relied
upon the vague and overwhelming notion that the United States had become more

of the War on Terror); Philippe Sands, Torture Team: Rumsfeld’s Memo and the Betrayal of
American Values (2008) (analyzing the Bush administration’s complicity in acts of torture as a
departure from the principles and values set forth in the Geneva Convention and the Torture
Convention); David Cole, Enemy Aliens: Double Standards and Constitutional Freedoms in the
War on Terror (2002) (asserting that the U.S. government’s use of torture in the name of the
War on Terror violated the civil liberties of non-U.S. citizens).
3.
See, e.g., Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture: The Secret History of America’s
“Extraordinary Rendition” Program, New Yorker, Feb. 14, 2005 (describing the rendition
program); Sarah Joseph, Rendering Terrorists and the Convention Against Torture, 5 Hum. Rts.
L. Rev. 339 (2005) (discussing the conflict between the practice of rendering terrorists and the
Convention Against Torture); Leila Nadya Sadat, Ghost Prisoners and Black Sites:
Extraordinary Rendition Under International Law, 37 Case W. Res. J. Int’l L. 309 (2005)
(criticizing the practice of extraordinary rendition as violative of the Geneva Conventions).
4.
S. Select Comm. on Intelligence, Committee Study of the Central Intelligence
Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program Executive Summary (2014) [hereinafter Senate
Report].
5.
David Cole & James Dempsey, Terrorism and the Constitution: Sacrificing Civil
Liberties in the Name of National Security (2006).
6.
John T. Parry, Constitutional Interpretation, Coercive Interrogation, and Civil Rights
Litigation after Chavez v. Martinez, 39 Ga. L. Rev. 733 (2005); Colin Dayan, The Story of Cruel
and Unusual (2007); James Forman, Exporting Harshness: How the War on Crime Made the
War on Terror Possible, 33 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 331 (2009).
7.
John T. Parry, Terrorism and the New Criminal Process, 15 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J.
765 (2007); Robert Chesney & Jack Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal
and Military Detention Models, 60 Stan. L. Rev. 1079 (2007).
8.
See Parry, supra note 6 (discussing Miranda rights and torture without reference to
broader criminological culture); Dayan, supra note 6 (analyzing the development of Eighth
Amendment doctrine); Parry, supra note 7; Chesney & Goldsmith, supra note 7 (discussing
militarization of criminal procedure).
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“punitive,” leading to a popular acceptance of torture practices. 9 The “punitive”
arguments assert a connection between the phenomenon of mass incarceration and
the acceptance of torture—a leap that is not easily made.10 They further rely on
the overly general idea that the U.S. public has become bloodthirsty, which fails
to explain why some detainees were tortured, while others were merely detained.
In this article, I argue that all of these developments are better explained
via reference to the overarching shift in criminal justice policies, away from
checks on law enforcement in favor of the prevention of harm—ultimately leading
to a devaluation of the presumption of innocence. I argue that, similar to this shift
in criminal justice tactics, torture may be seen as the result of a gradual change in
popular U.S. expectations regarding government, as evidenced by increasing
acceptance of torture-tolerant narratives in criminal procedure doctrine and
education. These changes in expectations in turn resulted in a new logic, a way
of weighing interests when analyzing the use of torture that reflected the newly
lessened value of formerly fundamental norms, and ignored others entirely. I call
this reasoning—a reasoning that frames the question of when and whether to use
physical abuse in a way that requires an approving answer—the logic of torture.
The origin of the logic of torture, and rationalization of its use, in the
conventional criminal context carries severe implications. It indicates that
proponents and critics alike are missing the true character of our use of torture.
Our rationalization of torture was not an exceptional response to either an
unprecedented risk or an unreasonable panic—rather, it arose as a response to the
more banal challenges of everyday policing. The use of torture, therefore, is
unlikely to stay buried in the domain of counterterrorism, and cannot be
explained, defended, or prevented from recurrence if our understanding of it is
limited to that extraordinary context. Its acceptance was not exceptional, and there
is little reason to think that its use will remain exceptional for long.
This article begins with an analysis of the preventive turn in criminal
procedure. Part II outlines the salient aspects of the preventive turn, and the way
in which it alters accepted norms and priorities in criminal justice. I focus in
particular on the movement in the criminal law towards avoiding possible harms,
and the tension this creates with the traditional balance of considerations in
criminal justice in order to eliminate concerns about defendants’ rights and
undermine the accepted norm that state action should be taken only when the state
is confident that harm will occur if it does not act. Following Peter Ramsay, 11 I
9.
Forman, supra note 6.
10.
See Forman, supra note 6 (using the exceptional rates of incarceration in the United
States, as well as rhetoric regarding incarceration, to argue that the use of torture in the “war on
terror” is an outgrowth of American punitiveness).
11.
Peter Ramsay, Imprisonment Under the Precautionary Principle, in Seeking
Security: Pre-Empting the Commission of Criminal Harms 193 (G.R. Sullivan & Ian Dennis
eds., 2012).
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refer to this practice as employment of the “precautionary principle,” which
allows extreme government action in response to a mere possibility of harm. 12
Once I have established the primary aspects of the preventive turn, I
discuss the way in which the use of torture, and discussion of torture, can be
reimagined as part of this turn. I assert that both the primary justification for
torture, the ticking time bomb hypothetical, and criticisms of that justification,
show the way in which the discussion of torture is in fact a discussion of the
propriety of applying the precautionary principle and a preventive framework. In
doing so I engage with the concept of the “ticking time bomb scenario,” its logical
flaws, and the way in which these flaws have been highlighted by recent terror
threats and the practices of the CIA.
In Part III, I turn to the history of this logic and its increasing acceptance
over time, prior to the terror attacks of 2001. Rather than a panicked response to
terrorism, I show that the narratives justifying torture were gaining acceptance in
appellate criminal cases, particularly within the discussion of the extent of
Miranda rights and also in the context of the due process rights of suspects and
convicts (in the development of the “shocks the conscience” standard). Here I
look not only to case law, but also to accepted norms and evolving exceptions as
represented by the description of doctrine in criminal procedure textbooks.
In Part IV, I conclude by highlighting the most salient features of the
judicial decisions and their descriptions in criminal procedure textbooks. I find
that rather than “thinking the unthinkable,” the use of torture, and narratives
defending its use, were well thought out long before the 2001 “emergency.” I
argue that this implies two important points: first, that the use of torture, having
developed its justification in the sphere of domestic criminal justice, is unlikely
to remain isolated in the quasi-international arena of counterterrorism and;
second, that proponents of human rights might do well to focus less on
exceptionalism and more on the domestic norms that appear to have given rise to
the problem in the first place.

12.
The precautionary principle emerged in the context of environmental law. Ramsay
uses the principle as an explanation of the risk-averse, preventive turn in criminal law, which
has been noted by numerous scholars. For discussion of the preventive turn in criminal law see
generally,
Ramsay,
supra
note
11 (discussing the precautionary principle); Lucia Zedner, Pre-crime and
Post-criminology?, 11 Theoretical Criminology 261 (2007) (analyzing the shift from a postcrime to pre-crime society); Andrew Ashworth & Lucia Zedner, Preventive Justice (2014)
(discussing the principles and values that should guide preventative criminal measures).
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II. THE LOGIC OF PREVENTION AND THE LOGIC OF TORTURE
A. Prevention
For several decades, sociologists and sociolegal scholars have been
noting a preventive turn in criminal justice. 13 Many descriptions of this
development have focused on the movement of the criminal justice system from
a position of reactive punishment to one of risk management 14 and from a focus
on individuals to management of populations. 15 Tactics employed as part of this
development include the policing of schools, the increasing use of stop-and-frisk,
and the use of population-based risk assessment tools in determining criminal
sentences.16
Other scholars focus on the continuous development of
quasi-criminal civil interventions, such as the use of control orders in the United
Kingdom, or the use of mental health (or other) statutes in order to preventively
detain individuals who are believed to be “dangerous.”17 Still more scholars
13.
Malcolm M. Feeley & Johnathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging
Strategy of Corrections and Its Implications, 30 Criminology 449 (1992); Ulrich Beck, Risk
Society: Towards a New Modernity (1992); Michael Louis Corrado, Punishment and the Wild
Beast of Prey: The Problem of Preventive Detention, 86 J. Crim. L. &. Criminology 778 (1996);
Carol S. Steiker, The Limits of the Preventive State, 88 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 771 (1998);
Gordon Hughes, Understanding Crime Prevention: Social Control, Risk and Late Modernity
(1998); Paul Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventative Detention as
Criminal Justice, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 1429 (2001); Christopher Slobogin, A Jurisprudence of
Dangerousness, 98 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1 (2003); Eric Janus, The Preventive State, Terrorists and
Sexual Predators: Countering the Threat of a New Outsider Jurisprudence, 40 Crim. L. Bull.
576 (2004); Jude McCulloch & Bree Carlton, Preempting Justice: Suppression of Financing of
Terrorism and the ‘War on Terror,’ 17 Current Issues in Crim. Just. 397 (2005); Eric Janus,
Failure to Protect: America’s Sexual Predator Laws and the Rise of the Preventive State (2006);
Richard V. Ericson, Crime in an Insecure World (2007); Lucia Zedner, Preventive Justice or
Pre-Punishment? The Case of Control Orders, 60 Current Legal Problems 174 (2007); Bernard
Harcourt, Against Prediction: Profiling, Policing, and Punishing in an Actuarial Age (2007);
Jonathan Simon, Governing Through Crime: How the War on Crime Transformed American
Democracy and Created a Culture of Fear (2007); Andrew Ashworth & Lucia Zedner, Defending
the Criminal Law: Reflections on the Changing Character of Crime, Procedure, and Sanctions,
2 Crim. L. and Phil. 21 (2008); Ashworth & Zedner, supra note 12.
14.
See Simon, supra note 13; see also Feeley & Simon, supra note 13, at 452 (describing
a “new” penology that is more concerned with techniques to identify, classify, and manage
groupings sorted by dangerousness in order to regulate levels of deviance, and not to respond to
individual deviants); Harcourt, supra note 13; Ericson, supra note 13.
15.
See Harcourt, supra note 13.
16.
See Harcourt, supra note 13.
17.
See Janus, Failure to Protect, supra note 13 (arguing that sexual predator laws are
signs of a preventive state in which the government casts wide nets of surveillance and
intervenes to curtail liberty before crimes of any type occur); see also Ian Dennis, Security, Risk,
and Preventive Orders, in Seeking Security: Pre-Empting the Commission of Criminal Harms
169 (G.R. Sullivan & Ian Dennis eds., 2012) (discussing the use of civil preventive orders to
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emphasize the criminalization of increasingly preparatory acts in order to prevent
criminal activity.18 These statutes may include, for instance, provision of aid to
terrorists in the form of providing safe harbor, expertise, or financial support. 19
Such statutes, criminalizing everything from the provision of money to the
provision of “expert advice,”20 have been the most commonly invoked federal
criminal terrorism statutes used in terrorism prosecutions in the United States. 21

provide security from the harm thought to be presented by the people subject to these orders);
John Stanton-Ife, Preventive Detention at the Margins of Autonomy, in, Seeking Security: PreEmpting the Commission of Criminal Harms 143 (G.R. Sullivan & Ian Dennis eds., 2012)
(discussing the use of mental disorders as a reason for compulsory civil detentions); Martin
Wasik, The Test for Dangerousness, in Seeking Security: Pre-Empting the Commission of
Criminal Harms 243 (G.R. Sullivan & Ian Dennis eds., 2012) (analyzing different measures of
dangerousness for protective sentencing of offenders aged eighteen and over); Lucia Zedner,
Erring on the Side of Safety: Risk Assessment, Expert Knowledge, and the Criminal Court, in
Seeking Security: Pre-Empting the Commission of Criminal Harms 219 (G.R. Sullivan & Ian
Dennis eds., 2012) (assessing the use of individuals as risk subjects within the criminal court);
Larry Alexander & Kimberly Ferzan, Danger: The Ethics of Preemptive Action, 9 Ohio St. J.
Crim. L. 637 (2011) (setting out defensible grounds for preventive restrictions of liberty for
“responsible but dangerous” actors); Michael Corrado, Sex Offenders, Unlawful Combatants,
and Preventive Detention, 84 N.C. L. Rev. 77 (2005) (describing the use of preventive detention
of sexual predators, undesirable aliens, the mentally ill, and unlawful combatants); Adam
Crawford, Governing Through Anti-social Behaviour, Regulatory Challenges to Criminal
Justice, 49 British J. Criminology 810 (2009) (arguing that Britain’s new anti-social behavior
agenda brought in regulatory tools that are used to circumvent and erode established criminal
justice principles; Janus, The Preventive State, supra note 13 (describing how governmental
social control and “radical prevention” policies are being used to identify “dangerous” people
and deprive them of their liberty preventively); McCulloch & Carlton, supra note 13 (using
suppression of financing of terrorism legislation to argue that these preventive measures erode
and sometimes reverse the presumption of innocence and lead to radical injustice); see also
Slobogin, supra note 13 (analyzing the degree of dangerousness necessary to justify preventive
detention); see also Zedner, Preventive Justice or Pre-Punishment?, supra note 13 (describing
the United Kingdom’s use of Control Orders and the way they side-step the criminal process to
impose burdensome restrictions ahead of any wrongdoing).
18.
See Kimberley Ferzan & Larry Alexander, Risk and Inchoate Crimes: Retribution or
Prevention?, in Seeking Security: Pre-Empting the Commission of Criminal Harms 103 (G.R.
Sullivan & Ian Dennis eds., 2012); Jeremy Horder, Harmless Wrongdoing and the Anticipatory
Perspective on Criminalisation (2012); Andrew Simester, Prophylactic Crimes, in Seeking
Security: Pre-Empting the Commission of Criminal Harms 61 (G.R. Sullivan & Ian Dennis eds.,
2012); Kimberly Ferzan, Inchoate Crimes at the Prevention/Punishment Divide, 48 San Diego
L. Rev. 1273 (2011); McCulloch & Carlton, supra note 13.
19.
See McCulloch & Carlton, supra note 13; Ferzan & Alexander, supra note 18;
Simester, supra note 18. Statutes criminalizing the provision of material support to terrorists
provide examples of such statutes from the U.S. perspective. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339(a)–(d)
(2002).
20.
See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010) (upholding the
constitutionality of the “expert advice or assistance” prong of material support).
21.
See Richard B. Zabel & James J. Benjamin, Jr., Human Rights First, In Pursuit of
Justice: Prosecuting Terrorism Cases in the Federal Courts 11 (2009), available at
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As Carole Steiker has noted, the tendency to study each of these
developments individually has undermined scholars’ ability to recognize and
respond to the overarching trend towards prevention in criminal justice, and its
ramifications, in spite of general agreement among these authors that the cause of
each development is in fact a focus on preventing (rather than responding to)
harm.22 Yet just the brief summary of tactics offered above highlights the ubiquity
of preventive practices. This ubiquity, in turn, suggests a broad legal cultural
development, a revolution of priorities in criminal justice, rather than a series of
responses to unique problems.
Of course, it must be acknowledged that criminal justice was always
preventive in some sense.23 One purpose of punishment is to deter future crime,
and surely crime prevention was always one aspect of efforts to incapacitate
criminals as well.24 But the current preventive turn notably evades due process
protections, which although perhaps merely half a century old, have come to be
seen as fundamental to modern conceptions of justice and fairness. 25 Quasicriminal detention, for instance, offers the state the ability to detain individuals
while circumventing standards of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or, in the case
of control orders and other responses to terrorism, the right to see and respond to
evidence against oneself.26 By detaining without proving guilt, the state threatens
the very existence of the presumption of innocence. 27
The legal philosophical critique put forward by legal philosophers, who
have perhaps done the most work on the preventative turn in criminal justice,
offers an excellent explanation of how the purpose and limits of criminal justice
interventions have changed in recent years. Under what might be considered a
traditional view of criminal justice interventions, the state refrains from imposing
on an individual unless and until some imposition is known to be necessary, such
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/uploads/pdf/090723-LS-in-pursuit-justice-09update.pdf.
22.
See Steiker, supra note 13, at 778.
23.
Ashworth & Zedner, Preventive Justice, supra note 12, at 11, 17, 21,
27–50; Ashworth & Zedner, Just Prevention: Preventive Rationales and the Limits of the
Criminal Law, in Philosophical Foundations of Criminal Law 279, 279 (Robin Duff & Stuart
Green eds., 2011) (“We also assume that the prevention of harm is one of the rationales of the
criminal law.”).
24.
See, e.g., Albert Alschuler, The Changing Purposes of Criminal Punishment: A
Retrospective on the Last Century and Some Thoughts about the Next, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 1
(2003) (stating that “the textbook purposes of criminal punishment” are “retribution, deterrence,
incapacitation, and rehabilitation”).
25.
See, e.g., Magnus Ulväng, Criminal and Procedural Fairness: Some Challenges to
the Presumption of Innocence, 8 Crim. L. & Phil. 469, 470 (including the right against selfincrimination and right to remain silent in a list of fundamental rules created to ensure fair trials).
26.
See Stanton-Ife, supra note 17; Dennis, supra note 17.
27.
Kimberly Ferzan, Preventive Justice and the Presumption of Innocence, 8 Crim. L.
& Phil. 505 (2014); Ashworth & Zedner, Preventive Justice, supra note 13, at 72, 131.
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as in the case of regulations on driving and other risky behavior, or justified by
the individual’s commission of a crime. In either case, the imposition on the
individual is justified only when the state has established that it is responding to
some harm that will occur, definitively, without its intervention (or that has
already occurred).28
This focus on the harm principle—the notion that the state should not
punish criminally unless some actual harm has been committed—respects and
protects the dignity and autonomy of individuals, by taking seriously the notion
that at any point an individual may change his or her mind regarding the
commission of a crime.29 Moreover, as Mill noted, the notion of acting prior to
the commission of a harm poses a greater risk of abuse than does a reactive
criminal law, as almost any freedom or capability granted to an individual might
make it more likely (by making it more possible) that the individual will use that
freedom to commit a crime. 30
While preventive crimes, criminalizing risky behavior, have always
existed, philosophers reason that criminalization does not threaten the harm
principle in the cases of individuals whose actions impair their ability to make the
decision to forego criminal behavior, and in the case of behavior that poses risks
even outside of the actor’s intent.31 As an example, carrying a loaded gun might
pose risks beyond an actor’s choice to shoot someone—merely dropping the gun
can harm someone, and can happen in spite of the actor’s specific intent to avoid
harming anyone.32 In such circumstances, criminalization of preventive behavior
does not threaten personal autonomy, since the ability of the individual to choose

28.
Peter Ramsay, Imprisonment Under the Precautionary Principle, in Seeking
Security: Pre-Empting the Commission of Criminal Harms 193, 193 (G.R. Sullivan & Ian
Dennis eds., 2012).
29.
G.R. Sullivan & Ian Dennis, Seeking Security: An Introduction, in Seeking Security:
Pre-Empting the Commission of Criminal Harms 1, 1–2 (G.R. Sullivan & Ian Dennis eds., 2012)
(explaining that liberal democracies place individual autonomy at a premium and this results in
the notion that criminal punishment should follow, rather than precede, harm); Larry Alexander
& Kimberly Ferzan, Risk and Inchoate Crimes: Retribution or Prevention?, in Seeking Security:
Pre-Empting the Commission of Criminal Harms 103, 107 (G.R. Sullivan & Ian Dennis eds.,
2012) (arguing that moral culpability exists only when an actor unleashes inalterable harm, but
that harm may be inalterable before a trigger is pulled).
30.
John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 95 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., 1978) (1859)
The preventive function of government . . . is far more liable to be abused
. . . than the punitory function; for there is hardly any part of the legitimate
freedom of action of a human being that would not admit of being
represented . . . as increasing the facilities of some form . . . of delinquency.
31.
Alexander & Ferzan, supra note 29; Jeremy Horder, Prophylactic Crimes, in
Seeking Security: Pre-Empting the Commission of Criminal Harms 79, 95–100 (G.R. Sullivan
and Ian Dennis eds., 2012) (suggesting that criminalization does not threaten the harm principle
when mere mistake might cause harm, because avoidance of mistakes is not controllable).
32.
Horder, supra note 31.
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to forego behavior that would cause the harm is already determined. In other
words, one might choose not to shoot a gun, but if one carries a gun and drops it,
one may still cause harm—and one cannot merely choose not to drop the gun,
because mistakes are inevitable.33 Therefore, the harm is still known, definite, and
unavoidable by the individual who is to be punished.
The reliance on actual harm having been committed, or becoming
inevitable, is not solely based on philosophical notions of liberty and autonomy.
It is also a pragmatic protection of the innocent. Sociologists discussing the
preventive state argue that its focus on risk-based, managerial practices
inexcusably imposes on the innocent (and the underprivileged). Feeley and Simon
discuss the creation of an underclass, overpoliced and underrepresented, whose
liberty is regularly imposed upon in the interests of preventing criminal
behavior.34 Bernard Harcourt35 and Stuart Scheingold36 warn of the manner in
which this process imposes upon already marginalized members of society,
ignoring questions of guilt and innocence in the effort to manage supposedly
dangerous classes (whose guilt at the general level is presumed, negating the value
of proving guilt on an individual level).
The presumption of innocence is a final hurdle in the state’s
responsibility to prove that it is acting only as a response to an actual and existing
harm that is directly connected to the individual upon whose liberty it plans to
impose. Traditional criminal justice is based on knowledge, proof, and individual
responsibility.37 In other words, traditional criminal justice is based on guilt.
In contrast, preventive criminal justice is based on risk. 38 Risk is
evaluated based on group characteristics, generalized notions of levels and
characteristics of crime shared by that group, and actuarial predictions of how
those criminal activities may be prevented.39 As Peter Ramsay describes, in
33.
Id.
34.
Feeley & Simon, supra note 13, at 467.
35.
Harcourt, supra note 13.
36.
Stuart Scheingold, Constructing the New Political Criminology: Power, Authority,
and the Post-Liberal State, 23 Law & Soc. Inq. 857, 868 (1998).
37.
See id. at 868–69 (“[T]he criminal process ordinarily ought to be invoked by those
charged with the responsibility for doing so, only when it appears that a crime has been
committed and when there is a reasonable prospect of apprehending and convicting its
perpetrator.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)).
38.
See Beck, supra note 13 (describing “the risk society”); Hughes, supra note 13
(outlining the trend towards risk and crime prevention in late modern criminal justice); Slobogin,
supra note 13, at 1–2 (discussing the influence of risk and dangerousness in criminal legal
jurisprudence); Ericson, supra note 13 (describing the influence of risk on criminal justice);
Zedner, supra note 13, at 174 (describing the development of criminal justice as increasingly
risk averse); Harcourt, supra note 13 (describing the use of profiling to manage high risk
populations).
39.
Scheingold, supra note 36, at 867–88 (discussing the combination of disciplinary
capabilities to monitor, evaluate, and surveil populations believed to have criminal propensities);
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shifting from reactive to preventive criminal justice, the conversation shifts from
one of known harm to one of unquantifiable danger. 40 Traditional, reactive
criminal justice processes have the opportunity to evaluate precisely what amount
of harm was done, and to whom, because the harm has been done (or was at a
point where its completion was not just wholly perceived but unavoidable). In
contrast, preventive measures act on some analysis of possibilities. Even if we
accept that those possibilities may be inevitable realities of large groups (based
on statistical knowledge of communities), the harm posed by the specific
individual upon whom the state is imposing is completely unknown. Vast
percentages of the population imposed upon may never engage in criminal
behavior, or may only engage in minor deviance, but the criminal process is used
in their cases as well-based on the idea that the community will commit some
amount of harm, as a whole, over time. 41
Rather than justifying state intervention on the known actions or known
risk posed by an individual, state intervention is justified based on an unknown
and unknowable danger to future possible victims. 42 Direct connection between
the individual imposed upon by the state and the harm the state is trying to prevent
is therefore no longer necessary.
This is in stark contrast to a philosophy that justifies state intervention
only based on the moral fault of the individual whose liberty is being curtailed, or
the harms known to be caused by certain proscribed activities. Rather than asking
whether actions by offenders justify state intervention, the moral consideration in
a system of preventive justice ignores the offender’s contribution, focusing
instead on the level of harm that might occur if the state does not act.
Indeed, at this point the determination of whether or not imposition on
the individual is justified has very little to do with the risk posed by that individual.
This may be seen in police rhetoric defending the practices of stop and frisk.
Police departments attempting to justify the practice routinely rely on the risk
posed by some gun carrying offender. For instance, Ray Kelly, former Police
Commissioner in New York City, defended stop and frisk by stating that:
Since 2002, the New York Police Department has taken tens of
thousands of weapons off the street through proactive policing
strategies. The effect this has had on the murder rate is
staggering. . . . That’s 7,383 lives saved—and if history is a
guide, they are largely the lives of young men of color. . . . To
critics, none of this seems to much matter. Sidestepping the fact
that these policies work, they continue to allege that massive
Harcourt, supra note 7 (discussing generalizations and impositions on groups of individuals due
to the use of actuarial methods to evaluate risk).
40.
Ramsay, supra note 28, at 201, 209–14.
41.
See supra notes 34–39 and accompanying text.
42.
Id.
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numbers of minorities are stopped and questioned by police for
no reason other than their race.43
Asked specifically about how he might respond to a resentful, innocent civilian
who is continually stopped in his neighborhood, Kelly responded that he was
interested in saving that boy’s life.44 Similarly, former New York City Mayor
Michael Bloomberg stated shortly before Kelly’s interview:
Critics say the fact that we’re ‘only’ finding 800 guns a year
through stops of people who fit a description or are engaged in
suspicious activity means that we should end stop and frisk.
Wrong. That’s the reason we need it—to deter people from
carrying guns. We are the first preventers. 45
Those eight hundred guns constituted only 0.1% of stops per year. 46 But the rarity
of finding guns is irrelevant. The relatively few times that guns are found, as well
as the deterrent effect of the stops themselves, are believed to justify the practice
in its entirety, because the safety gained over time by those few successes is so
large.
Bloomberg’s comments, as well as Kelly’s, show that the state is well
aware that most people frisked by police are completely innocent of the actions
that truly concern police. But their guilt or innocence is irrelevant. Instead, the
conversation concerns the amount of harm that might occur if frisks were
abandoned.47 Rather than justifying the imposition on individuals based on their
individual risks, the state justifies an overarching practice (ignoring the harm to
individuals) based on the overarching harm that might occur if the practice ceased.

43.
Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Dubious Math Behind Stop and Frisk, The Atlantic (July 24,
2013),
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/07/the-dubious-math-behind-stopand-frisk/278065/ (quoting Ray Kelly, former Police Commissioner in New York City).
44.
Nightline, NYPD’s Stop-And-Frisk: Racial Profiling or Proactive Policing?, ABC
News (May 1, 2013), http://abcnews.go.com/US/nypds-controversial-stop-frisk-policy-racialprofiling-proactive/story?id=19084229.
45.
Id.
46.
According to a 2013 New York Attorney General’s investigation. Office of Att’y
Gen., New York, A Report on Arrests Arising From The New York City Police Department’s
Stop-And-Frisk
Practices
(2013),
available
at
http://www.ag.ny.gov/pdfs/OAG_REPORT_ON_SQF_PRACTICES_NOV_2013.pdf.
In
1999, the Attorney General of New York released a report showing that guns had been found in
only 2.5% of stops between 1998 and 1999. Office of Att’y Gen., New York, The New York
City Police Department’s “Stop & Frisk” Practices 94 (Dec. 1, 1999) [hereinafter OAG Report],
available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/reports/stop_frisk/stop_frisk.htm.
47.
This argument has perhaps gained steam since stop and frisk has declined, coinciding
with an increase in gun violence, in New York. See, e.g., Barry Paddock et al., After Bloody
Weekend of 16 Shootings and 19 Wounded, Cops Arrest Only 2 as Number of City Shooting
Victims Spikes, Daily News (July 9, 2014), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nyccrime/bloody-weekend-19-injured-bullets-cops-arrest-2-article-1.1846552.
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Some of the most popularized, and blatant, calls for preventive justice
have come as part of calls for supposedly “exceptional” preventive measures in
the context of counterterrorism,48 and so it is useful to examine an example in that
context (although, as this article suggests, far fewer of those measures are as
“exceptional” as either critics or proponents of the practices claim). One such
example is the practice of preventively detaining terror (and other) defendants in
solitary confinement when they are believed to pose a risk of harm from jail. This
practice is often cited as an illustration of the extreme changes in criminal justice
brought about as a response to, and most often in the cases of, defendants accused
of terrorism.49 While early judicial rulings on the practice suggested that it could
be justified only when the individuals so held had shown their own personal
likelihood to cause a high level of harm from their jail cell (while awaiting trial,
as yet unconvicted of any criminal offence), 50 by 2001, judicial decisions clearly
suggested that defendants could be held in solitary confinement if the government
showed merely that they had the capability to cause serious harm. 51 Evidence of

48.
Viet Dinh et al., Life After 9/11: Issues Affecting the Courts and the Nation, Panel
Discussion at University of Kansas Law School, 51 U. Kan. L. Rev. 219 (2003) (describing the
need for a strategy of “preventative prosecution”); Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Att’y
Gen, Dep’t of Justice, to Heads of the Components of the Dep’t of Justice (Nov. 8, 2001),
available at http:www.fas.org/irp/news/2001/11/ag-memo-110801.html (asserting that the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 revealed need for a new, preventative criminal justice).
49.
Heena Musabji & Christina Abraham, The Threat to Civil Liberties and Its Effect on
Muslims in America, 1 DePaul J. Soc. Just. 83 (2007); Susan Akram & Maritza Karmel,
Immigration and Constitutional Consequences of Post-9/11 Policies Involving Arabs and
Muslims in the United States: Is Alienage a Distinction without a Difference?, 38 U.C. Davis L.
Rev. 609 (2005); Sadiq Reza, Unpatriotic Acts: An Introduction, 48 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 3
(2004); Sam A. Schmidt & Joshua Dratel, Turning the Tables: Using the Government’s Secrecy
and Security Arsenal for the Benefit of the Client in Terrorism Prosecutions, 48 N.Y.L. Sch. L.
Rev. 69 (2004); Joshua Dratel, Ethical Issues in Defending a Terrorism Case: How Secrecy and
Security Impair the Defense of a Terrorism Case, 2 Cardozo Pub. L. Pol’y & Ethics J. 81 (2003);
J. Soffiyah Elijah, The Reality of Political Prisoners in the United States: What Sept. 11 Taught
Us About Defending Them, 18 Harv. Blackletter L.J. 129 (2002).
50.
United States v. Gotti, 755 F. Supp. 1159, 1164–65 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (upholding
challenge of pretrial solitary confinement due to the lack of adequate evidence that the defendant
intended to engage in violent criminal behavior even while incarcerated); United States v.
Suleiman, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4647, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (upholding similar challenge as
in Gotti, despite defendant’s fingerprints on bomb manuals, allegations that he had terrorist
training, and that he had been associated with a member of the first World Trade Center bombing
conspiracy).
51.
United States v. El-Hage, 213 F.3d 74, 82 (2d Cir. 2000) (justifying continued
solitary confinement based solely on defendant’s capability to cause harm, with no discussion
of the likelihood that he intended to, or was likely to cause harm while incarcerated). See
generally Francesca Laguardia, Special Administrative Measures: An Example of Counterterror
Excesses and Their Roots in U.S. Criminal Justice, 51 Crim. L. Bull. 157 (forthcoming 2015)
(describing the transformation of SAMs practice from carefully overseen to reflexive and based
on mere possibility of harm).
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actual likelihood to do so was completely unnecessary. 52 Individual risk
assessments were, apparently, unnecessary. The fact that the defendants could
cause serious harm suggested a sufficient basis to severely restrict their liberty,
imposing the harshest form of confinement available in the criminal justice
system, years before a determination of guilt was made. 53 Moreover, the level of
imposition on the defendant steadily retreated from discussions of the propriety
of his confinement.54 The practice became routine. As one prosecutor noted, when
questioned, “everyone charged with a material support type crime is housed in the
same way”: pretrial solitary confinement.55 Once the defendant is indicted for a
certain type of crime, no further analysis of risk is necessary.
Since terrorism has captured the United States’ attention, and responses
to terrorism have as well, preventive tactics such as pretrial detention and solitary
confinement have been criticized roundly as deviant exceptions to accepted legal
and moral norms.56 Yet, like the use of pretrial solitary confinement, many
fundamental aspects of the preventive turn have taken place independent of this
context, and prior to 2001. Indeed, discussion of the preventive turn was well
underway in 1998, referencing developments in immigration law, detention of
juveniles, the use of loitering laws in efforts to curb drug and gang-related crimes,
and, of course, the use of stop and frisk. 57 The roots of this preventive turn, then,
seem to be in our criminal justice culture, rather than a reaction to the exceptional
nature of the threat of terrorism.

52.
Such evidence was provided in cases such as United States v. Nosair, 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12159, at *1–2 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), to argue that Nosair had been involved in the first
World Trade Center bombing conspiracy, and in United States v. Felipe, 148 F.3d 101, 104 (2d
Cir. 1998), to demonstrate that Felipe had directed murders from prison. The lack of such
evidence resulted in release in United States v. Gotti and United States v. Suleiman, but no
mention of such evidence was necessary to continue the detention of the defendant in United
States v. El-Hage.
53.
See supra note 51 and accompanying text. El-Hage was held for over fifteen months,
while later defendants were held for years at a time prior to trial. El-Hage, 213 F.3d at 78; see
After 3 Years in Pretrial Solitary Confinement, Fahad Hashmi Pleads Guilty on Eve of Terror
Trial,
Democracy
Now!
(Apr.
28,
2010),
http://www.democracynow.org/2010/4/28/after_3_years_in_pretrial_solitary
(discussing
Hashmi’s pre-trial detention in solitary confinement for over three years); Defendant’s Renewed
Motion for Conditional Release from the Longest Pretrial Imprisonment in United States History
at 1, United States v. Warsame, 651 F. Supp. 2d 978 (D. Minn. 2009) (Crim. No. 04-29) (on file
with author) (describing Warsame’s four and a half year detention in SAMs as the longest
pretrial detention in U.S. history).
54.
Laguardia, supra note 51.
55.
Transcript of Proceeding at 43, United States v. Sadequee, No.
1:06–CR–147–WSD, 2009 WL 3785566 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 10, 2009) (on file with author).
56.
Mayer, supra note 2; Sands, supra note 2; Cole, supra note 2; Cole & Dempsey,
supra note 5; see also supra note 49 and accompanying text.
57.
See generally Steiker, supra note 13 (describing the turn toward preventive justice
and scholars’ failure to acknowledge the developments up to that point).
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If I am right, and our preventive anti-terror practices have more to do
with criminal justice culture than with terrorism, we should be able to find
precursors of most of these “responses” in conventional criminal justice practices
and discourses. Early research on the use of pretrial solitary confinement suggests
that this is indeed the case, 58 and several other scholars have noted places where
supposedly unique responses to terrorism may actually predate the panic of the
early twenty-first century.59 But can more extreme deviations from accepted U.S.
norms
really
be
attributed
to
a
pre-2001 preventive revolution?
To begin an analysis of this question, there may be no better example
than the U.S. government’s use, and justification, of torture. With only a few
exceptions the words of David Cole can well summarize the starting point for
most scholars studying the use of torture since 9/11: “International and U.S. law
provide that torture is never justifiable . . . .”60 In the eyes of these scholars, the
fact that the United States tortured therefore signals a major break from the past,
showing that in the state of exception no past law can hold back the abusive state.
The fact that the United States not only employed torture, but that legal elites
offered legal approval for its use, shows that the rule of law, constitutional, and
human rights protections were always mere “parchment barriers”61 against
excessive state action. Of course, for the rule of law to provide an effective barrier,
that rule would have to be clearly opposed to the use of torture. As this article will
show, that opposition was not nearly as clear as critics like Cole would like to
believe.
Along with being a striking example of the United States’ supposed
deviation from its own prior norms (as well as its actual deviation from accepted
international norms) since 2001, torture provides an excellent example of the new
preventive logic of criminal justice. This suggests that, rather than sudden
deviance, torture may fit well within the preventive paradigm already well
underway in U.S. criminal justice.

58.
Laguardia, supra note 51 (discussing the evolution of pretrial solitary confinement
from its original applications against drug and organized crime defendants to a practice seen as
primarily used against suspected terrorists).
59.
Mary L. Dudziak, September 11 in History: A Watershed Moment? (2003); John
Hagan, Twin Towers, Iron Cages and the Culture of Control, in Managing Modernity: Politics
and the Culture of Control (M. Matravers ed., 2005); see also supra notes 6 (discussing the
development of material support statutes, the use of immigration violations to preventively
incapacitate suspected terrorists, and the use of informants in such investigations), 7 (discussing
the development of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and its relationship to coercive
interrogation), and accompanying text.
60.
David Cole, The Torture Memos 7 (2009).
61.
The Federalist No. 48, at 305 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
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B. Torture as Preventive Tactic
From the description of the preventive paradigm presented above, the
theoretical placement of torture in this paradigm should not be a difficult jump.
Nonetheless, it is worthwhile to discuss the logical connection between the
preventive paradigm and the use of torture in the War on Terror.
At least since 2001, the primary justification offered for the use of torture
has been the ticking time-bomb hypothetical.62 In this hypothetical situation,
interrogators are faced with the dilemma of knowing of an imminent terrorist
attack that threatens multiple lives (a time bomb somewhere in a city); knowing
that they have an individual in custody who has information that can prevent the
attack; and knowing that the individual will only provide that information if he is
tortured.
This hypothetical device is meant to place the spotlight directly on the
conflicting interests in U.S. jurisprudence regarding torture: on the one hand, there
is the interest of the public in obtaining vital information in order to prevent future
deaths; and on the other, there is the interest of the suspect in avoiding unbearable
pain.
But the ticking time-bomb situation, as so often described, completely
avoids the question of law enforcement’s accuracy in evaluating the situation. 63
Commonly, the hypothetical stipulates that law enforcement officers know for a

62.
John Ip, Two Narratives of Torture, 7 Nw. UJ Int’l Hum. Rts. 35 (2009); Luban,
supra note 1; David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, 91 Va. L. Rev. 1425,
1440 (2005); Scheppele, Hypothetical Torture in the “War on Terrorism,” 1 J. Nat’l. Sec. L. &
Pol’y 285 (2005). As these scholars describe, the narrative has strong public pull. In 2011,
General David Petraeus, soon-to-be Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, suggested that
extraordinary interrogation might be called for in situations where lives were at stake, such as
“to disarm a nuclear device set to explode under the Empire State Building.” Senator John
McCain (R-Arizona) quickly agreed, referring to a “ticking time bomb scenario.” Ken Dilanian,
Gen. David H. Petraeus Suggests Interrogation Policy for Emergencies, L.A. Times, June 23,
2011,
http://articles.latimes.com/
2011/jun/23/nation/la-na-petraeus-20110624. The agreement of the two was particularly notable
given that both are known to be opposed to the use of torture. This suggests that even those
lawmakers who are against torture in a general sense know there is a large political toll to
ignoring the ticking time bomb scenario. Similarly, as a presidential hopeful, future President
Barack Obama (as well as each of his competitors for the Democratic nomination) had to answer
the question of whether torture could be justified when “[w]e know there’s a big bomb going off
in America in three days and we know this guy knows where it is.” Obama responded that
America could not have a policy sanctioning torture, but he was careful to preface that statement
with the promise that “I will do whatever it takes to keep America safe. And there are going to
be all sorts of hypotheticals and emergency situations and I will make that judgment at that
time.” The Democratic Presidential Debate on MSNBC, N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/26/us/politics/26DEBATETRANSCRIPT.html?pagewanted
=all.
63.
Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, supra note 62, at 1442–45.
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fact that they have a guilty individual, implicated in a severe crime, who has
knowledge of how to stop this crime from occurring. But how do law enforcement
officers know that the individual they are holding has the information necessary
to find and/or defuse the bomb? How do they even know that a bomb exists?
By ignoring these questions, the suspect’s possible innocence—and
therefore, the possibility that the suspect cannot possibly deserve to be tortured—
is rendered irrelevant. The hypothetical erases innocence from consideration,
masking the interests of the suspect rather than focusing on them and dismissing
the fact that the person tortured is merely a suspect. His guilt and his knowledge
have been evaluated only by law enforcement officers. As history continues to
prove, law enforcement officers can be wrong even in such high stakes
scenarios.64
Accepting the hypothetical as representative of the interests at stake
necessarily erases the question of the torture victim’s innocence from the
conversation. It frames the debate so as to necessitate our acceptance of law
enforcement determinations, placing no checks on those determinations, and
removing from consideration even the possibility that law enforcement may be
incorrect. The philosopher engaging with this hypothetical and finding that torture
is justified is doing so based on one of two assumptions: either that torture is
justified because he has accepted, without any checks or proof, that law
enforcement is correct; or torture is justified because he does not care whether law
enforcement is correct. In either case, the possibility of preventing harm has
overcome the need for law enforcement officers to prove their suspicions before
being allowed to infringe on the suspects’ wellbeing. The focus of the debate is
instead on the possibility of rescuing future victims. The interests of the person
upon whose liberty the state will impose 65 have been erased from the calculus.
Readers may respond with the possibility that there is a high probability
that law enforcement is correct. This response highlights precisely the problem
caused by the hypothetical. The hypothetical is not framed in language suggesting
a high probability. Instead, it jumps straight to knowledge. Knowledge is
presumed, which cuts off the ability to question how high a probability of
correctness might be required before torture is appropriate, or what proof might
be required in order to determine that the probability is high enough. By beginning
the hypothetical with “law enforcement knows,” the thinker necessarily jumps
past these questions—at the same time hurdling past considerations of possibly
innocent suspects, now victims of (entirely good faith) law enforcement
64.
See, e.g., Scott Shane, Amid Details on Torture, Data on 26 Who Were Held in Error,
N.Y.
Times,
Dec.
12,
2014,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/
12/13/us/politics/amid-details-on-torture-data-on-26-held-in-error-.html?_r=0
(discussing
detainees held and tortured, but described by the CIA’s own documents as having been
“mistakenly detained”).
65.
And this is a euphemistic way to describe torture.
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assumptions. The purpose of the hypothetical is to skip these considerations,
thereby erasing them from public debate. For purposes of illustration, the
following sections highlight the considerations the time hypothetical so
conveniently ignores.

1. The Issues the Ticking Time Bomb Erases: There Exists a Bomb
Consider the case of the suspect who has boasted of leaving a bomb
somewhere in the city. We may be tempted to accept that here, surely, police
“know” that the bomb exists. Yet individuals have lied about placing bombs in
the past, either due to mental deficiency or efforts to threaten. By the time the
torture has begun, it will be difficult to convince law enforcement that the original
claim was a lie.
The recent release of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence’s
Report on the CIA’s use of torture exposes the possibility that law enforcement
may overestimate its knowledge of an imminent threat. The CIA’s enhanced
interrogation program has been repeatedly justified with reference to law
enforcement’s confidence that the United States was in danger of a nuclear attack
by al-Qaeda in the spring of 2002.66 Yet the only threat with a semblance of
nuclear capability that has been exposed to the public in the past twelve years is
that of José Padilla, whose nuclear aspirations consisted of creating a dirty bomb
by putting uranium in a bucket and “swinging it around [his] head as fast as
possible for 45 minutes.”67 This was the plot that Jay Bybee specifically pointed
to in order to highlight the nuclear threat that was believed to exist at the time the
OLC torture memos were written. 68 The foolishness of this plan was universally
agreed upon, by both law enforcement and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (the
mastermind of the September 11th attacks), who tasked Padilla with attacking

66.
See Interview by Lesley Stahl with Jose Rodriguez, former Dir. of the CIA’s Nat’l
Clandestine Serv., 60 Minutes: Hard Measures: Ex-CIA Head Defends Post 9/11 Tactics (Apr.
29,
2012),
available
at
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/
hard-measures-ex-cia-head-defends-post-9-11-tactics/3/; see also Jay Bybee, Classified
Response To The U.S. Dep’t of Justice Office of Professional Responsibility Classified Report
Dated
July
29,
2009,
14–15
(July
29,
2009),
available
at
https://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/opr-bybeefinal.pdf (describing the belief of the intelligence
community that hundreds of American lives would be lost if interrogations did not continue);
Senate Report, supra note 4, at 225–31 (describing the repeated use of discovery of the “Dirty
Bomb Plot” to justify enhanced interrogation based on the threat of nuclear attack).
67.
Senate Report, supra note 4, at 226.
68.
Id. at 227.
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high-rise buildings in Chicago using natural gas explosions instead. 69 Indeed, the
CIA determined that this second plot was also “infeasible as envisioned.”70
But consider a case where an officer has seen a bomb, evaluated it, and
determined that it requires a code to be disabled, or a specific wire cut. Even here,
the fact that the bomb will explode is assumed, and ignores the fact that
bombmaking is in fact rather difficult. Exemplifying this fact is the case of the
failed Times Square bombing in May 2010.71 Faisal Shahzad left a car full of
explosives set to ignite in Times Square, but the bomb failed to go off (Shahzad
had deviated from his originally planned explosive device because he was afraid
of detection, and his improvisation failed completely). 72 Alternately, there is the
case of “shoe bomber” Richard Reid, whose attempt to ignite a bomb on an
airplane failed, apparently after the fuse to the bomb became wet from weather
and Reid’s own sweat.73 Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab attempted a bomb similar
to Reid’s, but hidden in his underwear. That bomb would have exploded
(according to TSA officials), if not for the fact that Abdulmutallab wore the same
underwear for weeks prior to the bombing attempt, “degrad[ing]” the device to
the point where it could no longer detonate. 74
This raises a second misconstruction in the assumption that there exists
a threat of severe harm if no action is taken. The hypothetical assumes that the
police “know” of a bomb in a city that will explode. As mentioned above, there is
no explanation as to how they know this. There is no discussion of the likelihood
that it is true, or that it is false. That “many” lives will be lost is assumed and
seemingly relied upon for the legitimacy of the hypothetical. 75 There is no

69.
Id. at 225–26 nn.1301–06; see id. at 229 n.1312 (stating that it “took [the CIA] until
2007 to consistently stop referring to [Padilla’s] ‘Dirty Bomb’ plot—a plan [the CIA] concluded
early on was never operationally viable”); see also id. at 88 (demonstrating that the persistent
belief in the nuclear threat was apparently the result of poor signals intelligence).
70.
Id. at 231.
71.
Lorraine Adams & Ayesha Nasir, Inside the Mind of the Times Square Bomber, The
Guardian,
Sept.
18,
2010,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/
2010/sep/19/times-square-bomber.
72.
Devlin Barrett, Shahzad Used Poor Bomb Materials to Avoid Detection, Wall Street
Journal,
July
21,
2010,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB20001424052748704723604575379371725895584. According to another police source,
Shahzad had set the bomb to explode at 7 AM rather than 7 PM. Adams & Nasir, supra note 71.
73.
Ian Sample, Cargo Plane Bomb Plot: What Is PETN?, The Guardian, Nov. 1, 2010,
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/nov/01/cargo-bomb-plot-petn-explosive.
74.
Nicole Hensley, Underwear Bomb Aboard 2009 Flight Failed Because it was Sullied
by
Suicide
Bomber,
N.Y.
Daily
News,
July
25,
2014,
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/underwear-bomb-aboard-2009-flight-failedsoiled-article-1.1880193.
75.
This in spite of the fact that one of the most successful attacks in this country, the
Boston Marathon Bombing, claimed the lives of only three people. See Katharine Seelye,
Marathon Bombings Trial Will Remain in Boston, N.Y. Times, Sept. 24, 2014,
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consideration of how many lives are necessary to justify torture. A bomb in a city
is supposedly sufficient. Is the same true of a bomb in a town? A village? A bomb
tied to a person stranded alone in a desert?76

2. The Issues the Ticking Time Bomb Erases: The Suspect’s
Knowledge
Another possible mistake lies in the assumption that the suspect has
information worthy of torture. Independent of the moral standing of the suspect is
the question of whether the information he has can truly prevent deaths. The
question of how sure police are that this suspect can stop the bomb, or that they
can stop the bomb with information that they can coerce from him, 77 is similarly
ignored in this hypothetical situation. Again, the Report of the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence suggests that the CIA overestimated its knowledge in
this regard several times. Abu Zubaydah, for instance, was tortured largely due to
CIA beliefs that he could provide information about “the next attack in the U.S.”78
The CIA later determined that Abu Zubaydah never had this information. 79
Another example is that of Ramzi bin al-Shibh, who was tortured under
the assumption that he knew of “the next attacks planned for the U.S.” and “[w]ho
and where [operatives were] inside the U.S.”80 This assumption contradicted the
analysis of the detention site’s interrogators, who believed bin al-Shibh was
cooperative and was providing all the information he had.81 After three more
weeks of enhanced interrogation,82 for a total of thirty-four days of torture, the
CIA acknowledged it had been wrong regarding the level of information he
possessed.83
Similarly, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri was subjected to enhanced
interrogation based on the CIA’s beliefs that he had information about imminent

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/25/us/trial-of-marathon-bombing-suspect-to-remain-inboston-judge-rules.html.
76.
While I personally cannot see the logic in enumerating how many lives could justify
the use of torture—surely if it is worthwhile to save many lives, it would be worthwhile to save
just one—the assumption of the hypothetical is one of saving many lives, presumably bolstering
the strength of the case through notions of relative sacrifice and utilitarianism while
deemphasizing or entirely avoiding considerations of accuracy.
77.
A fourth possible fallacy, of course, exists in the assumption that torture is likely to
work better than traditional interrogations.
78.
Senate Report, supra note 4, at 31.
79.
Id. at 31.
80.
Id. at 78.
81.
Id. at 78.
82.
Id. at 79.
83.
See id. at 75 (noting that the CIA “concluded that bin al-Shibh was not a senior
member of al-Qa’ida and was not in a position to know details about al-Qa’ida’s plans for future
attacks”).
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plots and al-Qaeda operatives.84 In fact, high-ranking members of the CIA
maintained this belief, determining that it was “inconceivable” that he did not
have the information, despite the repeated analyses of interrogators to the
contrary.85 Nearly two years after this assessment was given for the last time, CIA
contractors determined that al-Nashiri never had the information that the CIA
sought.86
Arsala Khan was detained and tortured for a month before CIA
interrogators determined that he “[did] not appear to be the subject involved in . .
. current plans or activities against U.S. personnel or facilities . . . .”87 He was then
held in military custody for four years before the CIA determined that the source
that reported to the CIA regarding Kahn’s involvement with bin Laden had a
vendetta against his family.88
Indeed, even when an officer has seen an individual set the bomb himself
(should this ever happen, and it certainly almost never does), it is impossible to
know if the bomb can be stopped. As such, the hypothetical circumstance most
favorable to proponents of enhanced interrogation techniques still does not
guarantee that the detainee has valuable information to obtain through torture.

3. The Issues the Ticking Time Bomb Erases: Torture Will Work
The hypothetical is further flawed in assuming that police will be able to
obtain information through torture, or will know how to evaluate the truth and
falsity of any statements they do obtain. Here, once again, recent revelations are
telling. The declassified executive summary of the Senate Select Intelligence
Committee’s report on the use of torture by the CIA mentions, as we might expect,
that detainees lied in an effort to stop the torture. One footnote in the report tells
of a detainee who repeatedly contradicted himself, in a single session, apparently
in desperation.89 Connections between a Jemaah Islamiya cell and al-Qaeda were

84.
Id. at 65–67.
85.
Id.
86.
Id. at 73 (“21 months after the final documented use of the CIA’s enhanced
interrogation techniques against al-Nashiri, an assessment by CIA contract interrogator
DUNBAR
and
another
CIA
interrogator
concluded
that
al-Nashiri provided ‘essentially no actionable information,’ and that ‘the probability that he has
much more to contribute is low.’”).
87.
Id. at 110.
88.
Id.
89. The Committee Report states:
Samr al-Barq, told CIA interrogators that ‘we never made anthrax.’ . . .
[He] was told that the harsh treatment would not stop until he ‘told the
truth.’ According to cables, crying, al-Barq then said ‘I made the anthrax.’
Asked if he was lying, al-Barq said that he was. After CIA interrogators
‘demonstrated the penalty for lying,’ al-Barq again stated that ‘I made the
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similarly fabricated by a detainee being tortured.90 As discussed above,
interrogators spent weeks torturing detainees under the mistaken belief that the
detainees had more information than they were giving, unable to determine when
detainees were telling the truth.91
But more strikingly, the report also states that at least two individuals
were detained after Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, in response to being
waterboarded, falsely stated that they were linked to al-Qaeda.92 Indeed, Khalid
Sheikh Mohammed apparently withstood even waterboarding, regularly (and
convincingly) misleading interrogators.93
In fact, much of the U.S. invasion of Iraq may be linked back to the
torture of one detainee, rendered to Egypt as part of the U.S. program of
extraordinary rendition, whose statements that there were connections between
al-Qaeda and Saddam Hussein were used to justify the U.S. invasion. 94 The
detainee later stated that he had fabricated the connections in order to satisfy his
interrogators.95

4. How These Assumptions Highlight Torture’s Preventive Focus
and Flaws
The persistent defense, and the staying power of the ticking time bomb
hypothetical, boils down to “yes, but what if we know?” The response is, in a
preventive regime, we cannot know. It is impossible to know that the bomb will
explode, because bombs can be duds. It is impossible to know if we have the right
person, and what information he or she has, because suspects lie, witnesses lie,
and law enforcement gets things wrong. This is the forward-looking nature of
preventive tactics—because they are based on future events occurring, they are
unknowable.
The natural response is that the facts may be close enough to the truth,
i.e. “but what if we know enough?” This response only serves to show the success
of the hypothetical in framing the debate to rely on an undetermined, unquantified,
anthrax’ and then immediately recanted, and then again stated that he made
anthrax.
Id. at 82–83 n.442.
90.
See id. at 108–09 (“Hambali Fabricates Information While Being Subjected to the
CIA’s Enhanced Interrogation Techniques”).
91.
See supra notes 77–87 and associated text.
92.
Shane, supra note 64; Senate Report, supra note 4, at 83, 108 n.448.
93.
Senate Report, supra note 4, at 94–96.
94.
William Maclean, Libya Reports Prison Suicide of Top Qaeda Man, Reuters (May
11,
2009),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/05/11/us-libya-prisoner-deathidUSTRE54A4WU20090511.
95.
S. Rep. No. 109-331, at 81 (2006) (describing al Libi’s torture, including beatings
and placement in a box that was 50 cm by 50 cm, and his fabrication of the story in response to
that torture).
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and unquestioned balance of likelihoods and possible harms while pretending to
speak of certainty. The hypothetical cleverly avoids the questions of how much
is enough, how will be prove that much is known, and who will we trust to come
to those conclusions (questions which, our current criminal justice system
suggests, rely on processes that could not be completed quickly enough to respond
to a true ticking time bomb situation).
Similarly, critics point to these assumptions—that the “suspect” is at
least to some extent “guilty” (based on his terrorist knowledge), and/or that there
exists a large harm that can be prevented through his interrogation—as flaws in
the hypothetical,96 but in fact they reveal the workings of the precautionary
principle at its core. The harm posed by the ticking time-bomb need not be
quantified, “many” lives will be lost, and no further thought is necessary as to
how many lives are required in order to justify the conscious imposition of
extreme pain. We need not further examine whether law enforcement is accurate
in its belief that the bomb even exists, because the chance of the bomb poses a
large enough threat to justify intervention whether or not that intervention is in
fact necessary. The harm here is both uncertain and unquantifiable, but the fact
that it may be great offers justification for an extreme response.
In these ways, the ticking time-bomb hypothetical is the distilled essence
of the precautionary principle, and the preventive state. The flaws in the
hypothetical are precisely the assumptions that lead to preventive policies—the
hypothetical ignores innocence, it ignores the importance of certainty regarding
the situation and the possible harm threatened, and it manages to expunge
considerations of those individuals who may be affected by state policies by
redirecting focus solely to the (possible but uncertain) future victims of this
unquantified, uncertain harm. Here is where the philosophical transformation of
priorities occurs, in Garland’s words, from “protection from the state to protection
by the state.”97
As was noted above, this evolution in priorities appears to have begun
long before 2001, and as the use of torture and the ticking time-bomb justification
for that use so aptly summarize this shift in priorities, we might well expect to see
signs of that transformation in the acceptance of this logic prior to 2001. In fact,
as the following sections discuss, we do. These predecessors of the logic of torture
show that this logic was not an exceptional response to the threat of terrorism, or
to the panic caused by that threat. Rather than the threat of terrorism posing a risk
96.
Ip, supra, note 62; Luban, supra note 1; Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking
Bomb, supra note 62; Scheppele, supra note 62; G.R. Sullivan, The Hard Treatment of Innocent
Persons in State Responses to the Threat of Large Scale, and Imminent Terrorist Violence:
Examining the Legal Constraints, in Seeking Security: Pre-Empting the Commission of
Criminal Harms 293 (G.R. Sullivan & Ian Dennis eds., 2012).
97.
David Garland, The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary
Society 12 (2001).
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to our conventional criminal justice priorities by offering a slope for the nation to
slide down, it was the threat of kidnappers and rapists that created the slick slide
on which counterterror interrogators found themselves.

III. EARLY EVIDENCE OF THE LOGIC OF TORTURE
In testing whether or not the defense of torture was truly “unthinkable”
prior to 2001, it is worthwhile to look at the logic and justifications offered by
those who authorized and instigated the use of torture by U.S. forces. For these
purposes, the legal memos written by lawyers evaluating the program, relied upon
by the CIA to provide legal support for their activities, are particularly useful.
These memos offer insight into the way legal elites believed they could justify
torture.

A. Necessity, Self Defense, and Public Safety
In his first, infamous “torture memo,” John Yoo authorized the use of
torture based on the notion of necessity and self-defense, a justification that was
first floated by CIA officers and lawyers for the CIA as early as November 2001,98
and was repeated by later torture memo authors.99 Yoo argued that the
government’s interest in defending itself and its people can justify the use of
torture.100 According to Yoo, the likelihood of a damaging terror attack made
torturing a terror detainee the lesser of two evils, and therefore justifiable.101 CIA
attorneys similarly referred to the possibility of using the necessity defense when
torture could save “many,” even “thousands of lives.”102 In testimony before
Congress in November of 2001, Deputy Director of Operations for the CIA James
Pavitt specifically referred to the possibility of using torture in a situation where
“there is a nuclear weapon somewhere in the United States that is going to be
detonated tomorrow, and I’ve got the guy who I know built it and hid it.”103
This justification was implicitly repeated in 2005, while it was carefully
and painstakingly avoided in official memos in the years in between. 104 Yet even
98.
Senate Report, supra note 4, at 31, 179.
99.
Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to
Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation Under
18 U.S.C. §§ 2340.2340A, at 1 (Aug. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Yoo I Memo], available at
http://www.justice.gov/olc/docs/memo-gonzales-aug2002.pdf.
100.
Id.
101.
Id.
102.
Senate Report, supra note 4, at 179–80.
103.
Id. at 437 n.2447.
104.
Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen.,
Office of Legal Counsel, to John Rizzo, Acting Gen. Counsel, CIA, Re: Application of the War
Crimes Act, the Detainee Treatment Act, and Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions to
Certain Techniques that May Be Used by the CIA in the Interrogation of High Value al-Qaeda
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while the OLC seemed to be distancing itself from the logic of necessity as a
justification for torture, in August 2004, another detainee was tortured based on
precisely that reasoning.105 Even as late as July 2007, the CIA’s program was
being justified in legal memoranda as necessary in order to obtain lifesaving
information regarding “imminent” bomb threats.106
In making these claims, Yoo, the OLC, and CIA attorneys, invoked the
shadow of the ticking time-bomb scenario. U.S. lawyers were not alone in making
this defense, nor did it arise purely in the wake of the 2001 attacks. Instead, the
argument had already appeared in Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v.
Israel,107 which was cited by CIA attorneys,108 and by 2000, the question of
whether state use of torture could be justified in a ticking time bomb situation had
made its way into U.S. criminal law textbooks.109 By 2004, the textbook was used
Detainees 3–4 (May 30, 2005), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/docs/memowarcrimesact.pdf (concluding that the CIA’s interrogation program does not shock the
conscience because the interests at stake are so large).
In 2004, after the Yoo Memos became public, the Department of Justice acted to distance
itself from Yoo’s reasoning, including his analysis of the definition of “specific intent,” his
claims of the reach of executive authority, and his understanding of the protections that might
be offered by the necessity defense. However, rather than disagreeing with the reasoning, the
Justice Department wrote new memos relying on factual claims of the level of pain caused by
various techniques—the reasoning itself remained unchallenged, if momentarily set aside, until
it was reborn in 2005 via direct reference to criminal procedure, Fifth Amendment limitations,
and the importance of government interests. See Christopher Kutz, Torture, Necessity and
Existential Politics, 95 Cal. L. Rev. 235, 248–49 (2007) (noting that “the Levin memo
specifically does not address the Bybee memo's analysis of the micro-necessity criminal
defenses, nor does it take up the Bybee memo’s claim that legislation may not constrain the
President from acting on military necessity during times of war” and discussing the ways the
necessity doctrine continued to be used by the Bush Administration in the case of torture and
counterterror policies more generally); Memorandum from Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Att’y
Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to James B. Comey, Deputy Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel,
Legal Standards Applicable Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340.2340A, at 1–2 (Dec. 30, 2004), available
at
http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/terrorism/dojtorture123004mem.pdf
(calling
the
discussion of defenses “unnecessary”).
105.
See Senate Report, supra note 4, at 416–17.
106.
Id. at 434. These threats included, again, Jose Padilla’s “Dirty Bomb Plot” and the
similarly derided plot to dismantle the Brooklyn Bridge using “machine tools.” See id. at 434–
35, 435 n.2438 (“[T]he former chief of CTC’s Bin Ladin Unit described [the plot against the
Brooklyn Bridge] as ‘half-baked,’ and ‘more of a nuisnance [sic] than a threat.’”); see also id.
at 283 n.1605 (“[He] wrote: ‘again, odd. ksm wants to get ‘machine tools’ to loosen the bolts on
bridges so they collapse? did he think no one would see or hear these yahoos trying to unscrew
the bridge?’”).
107.
See HCJ 5100/94 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Isr. [1999] (Isr.).
108.
See Senate Report, supra note 4, at 19 n.51.
109.
See Sanford Kadish & Stephen Schulhofer, Criminal Law and Its Processes (6th ed.
2000). It is worth noting that Jennifer Koester, Yoo’s co-author of the memos, who the Office
of Professional Responsibility claimed bore “initial responsibility for a number of significant
errors of scholarship and judgment” would have been in law school in 2000. Office of Prof’l
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in Criminal Law classes, including at New York University, Georgia State
University, George Mason University, Hofstra University, Pace Law School,
Harvard, and the University of Chicago. 110 By 2001, the discussion had made its
way into at least one criminal law class at an elite institution, and another by 2004
(prior to the revelations regarding the United States’ use of torture).111
But this pure question of necessity was not the only inroad into the
acceptance of physical brutality as a part of interrogation in the face of an
immediate threat. Instead, the ticking time bomb scenario had appeared numerous
times already, in response to the criminal procedure requirement that suspects be
advised of their right to an attorney prior to custodial interrogation. It is worth
briefly retelling the history of this doctrine in order to contextualize it.
The Miranda doctrine112 arose as a response to the types of coercive
interrogation in which law enforcement routinely engaged leading up to the mid1960s, when the case was decided. Prior efforts to stem the tide of brutal police
interrogation
practices
led
to
a
hodge-podge of rules given on a case-by-case basis and limited to the case at hand.
Police moved through a variety of tactics, and the Supreme Court’s analysis was
specific to the facts of each individual case, so that a decision that police could
not hold a defendant, naked, for hours, meant nothing to a decision as to whether
police could “threaten to bring in his ailing wife” or threaten to take away a
defendant’s children if she refused to cooperate with the interrogation. 113 Police
Responsibility, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Investigation into the Office of Legal Counsel’s
Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the Central Intelligence Agency’s Use of “Enhanced
Interrogation Techniques” on Suspected Terrorists, 188 (drft. Dec. 22, 2008) (on file with
author). Although most likely she would have completed her criminal law class prior to 2000,
she may have heard of the case and argument in other classes.
110.
See Harry Subrin, Criminal Law Syllabus, New York University (2004) (on file
with author); Georgia State University Criminal Law Syllabus (2002), available at
http://laws.gsu.edu/wedmundson/Syllabi/CRIM02.SYL.htm; George Mason Initial Class
Assignments
(2003),
available
at
http://www.law.gmu.edu/academics/assignments/2003/2003spring; Hofstra University School
of
Law
First
Year
Book
List
(2003),
available
at
http://www.hofstra.edu/pdf/law_1styearbooklist_f2003_812.pdf; John Humback, Criminal Law
Analysis
and
Writing,
Pace
University
(2002),
available
at
http://lawweb.pace.edu/jhumbach/ASSGNMT-1st.htm; Carol Steiker, Criminal Law Outline,
Harvard Law School (on file with author); Stephen Schulhofer, Criminal Law Outline,
University of Chicago (on file with author); Jacqueline McMurtrie, Criminal Law Outline,
University
of
Washington
School
of
Law
(2004),
available
at
http://faculty.washington.edu/jackiem/Criminal_Law_2004/
Syllabus.htm.
111.
See Criminal Law Outline, University of Chicago, supra note 110; Criminal Law
Outline, New York University, supra note 110.
112.
So called because it was first iterated in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
113.
See Jerome Skolnick, American Interrogation: From Torture to Trickery, in
Torture: A Collection 105, 113–14 (Sanford Levinson ed., 2004); see also Charles D.
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continued to employ the “third degree” through the 1960s, which could include
such interrogation methods as beatings, extended interrogations, 114 and the sweat
box (in which suspects were placed in incredibly small rooms containing stoves
so they would suffer from extreme heat conditions until coerced into
“confessing”).115 Finally, rather than continuing to rule individual methods
unconstitutionally coercive, the Supreme Court ruled that suspects must be
advised of their right to counsel.116 This created a bright-line rule that limited
police conduct far more than a prohibition on brutality by avoiding the constant
argument as to what level of abuse was sufficient to constitute “brutality.” In
contrast to prior decisions on interrogations, Miranda seems to have successfully
limited police use of force in interrogations,117 but it was subject to immediate
public backlash.118
Public and scholarly critique of the Miranda requirements often took the
same form, that of the “kidnapping hypothetical,” a variant and precursor of the
ticking time bomb.119 In this hypothetical situation a child is kidnapped, the
perpetrator (but not the child) is found, and has already suggested that the victim’s
life is in danger, but questioning of the perpetrator must wait for a lawyer to be
made available to the suspect.120 The hypothetical was later reiterated in response
to Miranda, and quickly developed to include an imminent threat to the victim's
life.121

Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 Cornell L. Rev. 109, 115 (1998) (listing similar cases
exemplifying the difficulties created by the lack of a bright line rule on voluntariness).
114.
While the Supreme Court determined in 1944 that thirty-six hours was too long to
interrogate a suspect under constitutional requirements, recent research shows that police often
continue to interrogate suspects for as long as twenty-four hours. See Steven Drizin & Richard
Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C. L. Rev. 891, 894
(2003).
115.
See Skolnick, supra note 113, at 112.
116.
See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478–79.
117.
Skolnick, supra note 113; Drizin & Leo, supra note 114.
118.
Carol Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two
Audiences, Two Answers, 94 Mich. L. Rev. 2466, 2466 (1996).
119.
See Allen Rostron. The Law and Order Theme in Political and Popular Culture,
37 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 323 (2012) (discussing Dirty Harry as representative of the broader
public backlash to Miranda). The kidnapping hypothetical seems to have first appeared in
response to an earlier right to counsel case, which is typically considered a Miranda precursor.
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
120.
Henry Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 Calif. L.
Rev. 929, 949 (1965).
121.
Henry Friendly, Benchmarks 277 (University of Chicago Press, 1st ed. 1967). See
William Pizzi, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in a Rescue Situation, 76 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 567, 568–69 (1985) (referencing Friendly’s articulation of the kidnapping
hypothetical).
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The hypothetical achieved more public attention when it was popularized
in the movie Dirty Harry in 1971.122 There, the situation was more extreme. Rather
than simply being kidnapped, the victim, a 14-year-old girl, was buried alive and
drawing her last breath at any moment. Dirty Harry, the hero cop who refused to
play by the rules, found the perpetrator, shot him in the leg, held his gun to the
perpetrator’s head, and threatened to kill him if he did not reveal the girl’s
location. The perpetrator, of course, requested a lawyer. Dirty Harry proceeded to
step on the perpetrator’s wounded leg, applying pressure until the perpetrator,
screaming in agony, finally gave up the requested information. Police rushed to
the location, but it was too late—the girl was dead.123
The thirty years preceding the 2001 attacks show increasing acceptance
in criminal law of the framework and reasoning of the kidnapping or ticking time
bomb hypothetical as a way to evaluate when torture might be used in order to
facilitate interrogation. In 1974, the California Court of Appeals ruled that
statements obtained prior to the provision of an attorney would be admissible in
court when they had been obtained as part of an emergency situation where the
primary interest of questioning police officers was to save a life.124 This case
reaffirmed a previous case, People v. Modesto,125 which responded to Escobedo,
the case from which the kidnapping hypothetical originates, and made a similar
ruling that had come into question after the Miranda decision.
Eight years later, the Florida Court of Appeals came to a more extreme,
if connected, determination. In Leon v. State,126 several officers had attacked a
kidnapping suspect. In the words of the appellate court, “[t]hey threatened and
physically abused him by twisting his arm behind his back and choking him until
he revealed where [the victim] was being held.”127 The record does not suggest
the officers had any reason to believe there was an imminent threat to the victim’s
life (other than the fact that kidnapping is often followed by the murder of the
victim). Yet the ruling opinion held that the defendant’s later confession to
unrelated police officers was not affected by the earlier coercion, in large part
because the coercion had been applied solely in order to save the victim’s life, and
not to obtain a confession.128 The case was affirmed by the Eleventh Circuit,
which similarly noted that “[t]his was . . . a group of concerned officers acting in

122.
Dirty Harry (Warner Bros 1971).
123.
Id. See Michael Paulsen, Dirty Harry and the Real Constitution, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev.
1457 (1997) (describing the movie and its relation to criminal procedure).
124.
People v. Dean, 114 Cal. Rptr. 555, 561–62 (Cal. App. 1974).
125.
42 Cal. Rptr. 417 (Cal. App. 1965).
126.
410 So. 2d 201 (Fla. App. 1982).
127.
Id. at 202.
128.
Id. at 203.
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a reasonable manner to obtain information they needed in order to protect another
individual from bodily harm or death.”129
By this time, the Escobedo situation had already come to life in New
York, and in 1984 an appellate ruling came down in the case resulting from those
facts. Like Leon v. State, People v. Krom,130 dealt with a kidnapping. However,
unlike Leon, the victim was not held in an apartment while ransom was arranged.
Instead, she was buried alive in a wooded area, and by the time the defendant led
police to her whereabouts, she was dead.131
Interestingly, there is no hint in the appellate case that the police officers
that interrogated Krom knew that his victim was in such dire circumstances until
she was located. Krom demanded money and immunity in exchange for revealing
the victim’s whereabouts, and he eventually won promises from the government
and the victim’s father complying with those demands.132 He claimed that he had
made efforts to prevent the victim from suffocation by shooting holes in the lid of
the box in which she was buried.133 The credibility of this statement is not
commented upon in the record, but this claim of an intention not to kill the victim
and the lack of information in the record as to the police officers’ knowledge of
the victim’s imminent death both suggest that the defendant had not threatened
his interrogators with her death and that the interrogators did not consider this
possibility.134
But the court’s ruling makes clear that whether police knew how serious
the situation actually was is irrelevant in a kidnapping case. In justifying the
admission of Krom’s statements into evidence, the court created an emergency
exception to its procedural requirements (one already existing in New York’s
Fourth Amendment doctrine in kidnapping situations), stating that when “police
are engaged in their primary duty of attempting to provide assistance to a person
whose life is, or may be, in danger,” such an exception would be appropriate.135
The court’s discussion of a preexisting Fourth Amendment exception to the
warrant requirement similarly makes clear that a life-threatening emergency

129.
Leon v. Wainwright, 734 F.2d 770, 773 (11th Cir. 1984).
130.
61 N.Y.2d 187, 192–93 (1984).
131.
Id. at 195.
132.
Id. at 194.
133.
Id. at 195.
134.
The possible procedural violation in Krom was not a Miranda violation per se.
Instead it involved New York’s even higher standards, requiring that all interrogation or efforts
to convince a defendant to waive his right to an attorney cease once a defendant has invoked his
right. In Krom’s case, police merely continued to question him (and attempted to bargain with
him) in order to get him to cooperate. Id. at 197–98.
135.
Id. at 198 (emphasis added).
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situation is presumed to exist in a kidnapping case, and that in such circumstances,
exceptions to procedure are acceptable.136
While these isolated cases bore similarities to one another, the
nationwide discussion began in earnest with the decision of New York v.
Quarles.137 In that case, a police officer entered a store and demanded to know
where a suspected rapist had hidden his gun. An exception to the Miranda
doctrine was created, allowing the use of this statement at trial, based on the idea
that the gun may have been on the premises and that some bystander might have
happened upon the gun, thereby putting him and the surrounding public in
jeopardy.138 One dissent noted emphatically that there would be no question that
a police officer could question a suspect without offering Miranda warnings in
the case of a bomb about to explode.139 As the following section makes clear, this
case brought to the rest of the country the “public safety,” “emergency,” or
“rescue” exception to the Miranda requirements and in a manner that went beyond
the allowance of mere questioning.

B. Beyond Doctrine: The Entrance of the Ticking Time Bomb in the
Socialization of Legal Elites
These concerns slowly entered elite legal culture, as evidenced by their
inclusion in basic criminal procedure textbooks. Here, concerns were included in
discussions of what might be referred to as a “public safety exception,”140 a
“rescue doctrine,”141 or, notably, an “emergency exception”142 to Miranda’s
bright line rule.
In order to analyze the acceptance of emergency exceptions to the right
against abusive interrogation, I looked to the evolution of criminal procedure
textbooks from 1970 through 2005. After a preliminary examination of fifteen
textbook series (those series I could find that had existed prior to 1980 and
136.
Id. at 198–99 (“In Fourth Amendment cases this court and others have recognized
an emergency exception which permits the police to enter premises, without a warrant or
probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed, in order to search for a person who
is missing and may be in danger.” (emphasis added)).
137.
467 U.S. 649 (1984).
138.
Id. at 655–56. In fact, this danger was almost nonexistent because the environment
was completely controlled, the store was empty, it was the middle of the night, and there was
sufficient police presence to easily surround and cut off all access to the store. Id. at 676
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
139.
Id. at 686 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that while the questioning should be
legal, admission of the statements as evidence should not).
140.
Yale Kamisar et al., Modern Criminal Procedure: Cases, Comments, and Questions
532 (9th ed. 1999).
141.
Id. at 538.
142.
Stephen Saltzburg & Daniel Capra, American Criminal Procedure 519 (3d ed.
1988).
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continued through 2002), I limited my analysis to those textbooks used most
heavily in 2003, in order to ensure that I covered the most well-accepted doctrine
of the time (as represented by its presence in established law schools).143 These
series are listed as Appendix A. In order to evaluate how this law evolved over
several decades, I obtained editions of the textbooks, to the extent that they
existed, dating back to the Miranda decision.144
To analyze the evolving acceptance of exceptions to the prohibition on
coercive interrogation I performed content analysis and word counts, to represent
the extent of discussion on the issue.145 My content analysis focused on narratives
and themes used by the authors to describe the evolving public safety exception.
I looked to the phrases used to describe the exception (in some cases “emergency,”
in others, “public safety” or “rescue”), which offer a clue as to the purposes these
authors believed were determined to be (and students in the process of legal
socialization absorbed as being) legally sufficient to negate Miranda and other
protections against coercive interrogation.
I further looked for signs that the authors were attempting to
problematize the doctrine, by offering counterlogic, oppositional cases or
naturally (logically) following doctrine that seemed unreasonable. 146 I evaluated
whether authors offered additional supportive or unsupportive legal reasoning,
such as dissenting opinions, supportive case law, and supportive or unsupportive
legal scholarship.
I rely particularly heavily on Kamisar et al.’s Modern Criminal
Procedure: Cases, Comments, Questions, which seems to hold an established
position as the dominant criminal procedure textbook in the United States. 147 Most
143.
See Stephanos Bibas, The Real-World Shift in Criminal Procedure, 93 J. Crim. L.
& Criminology 789, 792–93 (2003) (providing data on how many law schools use each of the
major criminal law textbooks).
144.
I also collected several textbook series based on the fact that they had lasted from
the 1970s through 2001, but as I could not get reliable statistics on their usage in law schools, I
omitted them from my final analysis.
145.
For prior use of this technique, see generally Joachim Savelsberg & Peter King,
American Memories: Atrocities and the Law (2011) (performing word counts in history
textbooks as part of an analysis of the dominance of trial narratives in American understanding
of the Mai Lai massacre).
146.
Examples of such problematization were surprisingly absent. One textbook series
did offer a discussion of Quarles prior to a discussion on due process protections and, after a
few pages, suggested that threats of physical violence might present “a per se factor” of
involuntariness. See Stephen A. Saltzburg & Daniel J. Capra, American Criminal Procedure:
Cases and Commentary 625, 629–30 (6th ed. 2000).
147.
Douglas Kahn, Yale Kamisar: A Principled Man For All Seasons, 102 Mich. L.
Rev. 1722 (2004); Daniel Yeager, Searches, Seizures, Confessions, and Some Thoughts on
"Criminal Procedure: Regulation of Police Investigation—Legal, Historical, Empirical, and
Comparative Materials, 23 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1043 (1996); Bibas, supra note 143. Yale Kamisar
et al. have written one of the twenty most cited legal texts, according to a 2005 analysis of texts
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importantly, Kamisar et al.’s text was well established both before and after 2001,
giving insight into the way the emergency exception entered the legal discussion,
rather than its mere existence in the moment.
These textbooks represent not only the opinions of influential and
prestigious members of the legal academy, but they form the basis of
understanding for students entering the legal field. Unlike specific precedent,
which may be debated, textbook discussions are presented as fact. Any argument
that appears in a textbook acquires at least some credibility, as there is an
assumption that, if it were entirely incredible, it would be omitted from discussion.
While questions and hypotheticals may offer some room for critical analysis, the
cases presented directly after those questions become baseline legal authority for
young law students, establishing a foundation of legal thought and a broad outline
of the contours of the legal discussion on the matter.
Any legal decision may be considered supportive of the notion that the
ideas in the opinion are, at least, within the realms of legal possibility (that those
ideas passed at least one laugh test). But cases cited in legal textbooks obtain this
authority for students before they have formed any other conception of the law of
the land. Therefore, these cases become a starting point for young lawyers, upon
which any following legal research rests and against which it may be compared.148
To be sure, this methodology has its limitations. First, it is always
possible for a student to reject the statements of the textbook entirely. Second, we
cannot be sure how much each individual professor stressed these aspects of
criminal procedure, entirely skipped over them, or even personally undermined
the claims the textbooks were making. Finally, these textbooks are only a small
sample of the dozens of criminal procedure textbooks on the market, and it is
possible that even their most uniform aspects are chance occurrences that are not
representative of the majority of criminal procedure classes.
Still, at the very least these textbooks are a window into the education of
thousands of young lawyers each year for over a decade, as well as the accepted
wisdom of those experts who seem to be most trusted by other scholars in the
field. At a minimum, the presence of the torture narrative in these textbooks
suggests that it was far from unimaginable in legal thought preceding the terror
attacks of 2001, and the uniformity of the narrative (described below) in the
dominant texts of the time makes it highly unlikely that these textbooks were
complete outliers.

and treatises written between 1978 and 1999. Fred R. Shapiro, Most Cited Law Books of All
Time, Wash. Univ. Sch. of Law, http://lib.law.washington.edu/ref/mostcited.html (last updated
Jan. 14, 2005).
148.
For an analysis of the way in which law school, and particularly the first year of
law school, fundamentally changes the thinking and worldview of law students, see Elizabeth
Mertz, The Language of Law School: Learning to Think Like a Lawyer (2007).
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These popularly used textbooks, therefore, occupy a particularly
powerful position in the creation and representation of the dominant legal culture.
However, I also looked to citations of the relevant cases, in order to evaluate their
staying power and reach among judges and in case law nationwide.
Under this analysis it is apparent that Quarles quickly created a weakness
in the prohibition on coercive interrogation. Following the decision, textbooks
immediately began to include an excerpt of Quarles, possibly with half a page of
notes on other cases and dilemmas presented by the need to protect the public. 149
Quarles was merely the most cited example of the cases appearing across
the country,150 and as scholars began to discuss the issue,151 the lacuna of the
public safety exception expanded. This, too, was reflected in criminal procedure
textbooks. In Kamisar, et al., 1980–2005, the number of words used to describe
issues related to the public safety exception (outside of the continued presence of
the excerpt from New York v. Quarles) rose from zero, to 334 words in 1986, and
to 549 words in 1999 and 2002 (See Table 1). In 2005 the space allotted to such
questions quadrupled, clearly in response to questions of torture (although
brutality had already received attention in previous years with reference to Leon
v. State).

TABLE 1: NUMBER OF WORDS USED TO DISCUSS PUBLIC SAFETY
EXCEPTIONS TO MIRANDA IN EDITIONS OF KAMISAR ET AL.’S MODERN
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES, COMMENTS, QUESTIONS.
1980 (Fifth Edition)

0

1986 (Sixth Edition)

334

1990 (Seventh Edition

419

1994 (Eighth Edition)

419

1999 (Ninth Edition)

549

2002 (Tenth Edition)

549

2005 (Eleventh Edition)

2000

149.
See Yale Kamisar et al., Modern Criminal Procedure: Cases, Comments, Questions
599 (6th ed. 1986); Stephen A. Saltzburg & Daniel J. Capra, American Criminal Procedure:
Cases and Commentary 519 (3rd ed. 1988).
150.
See supra notes 124–137 and accompanying text; State v. Finch, 975 P.2d 967
(Wash. 1999).
151.
See, e.g., Pizzi, supra note 121 (discussing the rescue situation); Charles
Weisselberg, Saving Miranda, 84 Cornell L. Rev. 109 (1998) (discussing exceptions to the
Miranda requirements).
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Recall that, as Kamisar et al. state, in Leon v. State one judge held that
“the use of police threats and physical violence at the scene of arrest in order to
ascertain the kidnap victim’s whereabouts ‘did not constitutionally infect the later
confessions.’”152 Recall that, in that case, officers had exceeded Miranda’s
limitations not with questioning, but with physical abuse. 153 Notably, the reason
this activity was excused from due process protections was in large part because
(as would later be suggested in the Yoo and Bybee memos) the intention of police
officers was to save the victim’s life.154
In textbooks, Leon appears to have been subsumed in Quarles, but Leon
did carry some life of its own, as is seen in its citation record. By 2001 the case
was cited in five cases (four in Florida and one in Alabama), 155 seven scholarly
articles,156 and Kamisar et al. (along with one other criminal procedure
textbook).157 Between 2001 and 2010 the case was cited in three books158 and

152.
Yale Kamisar et al., Modern Criminal Procedure: Cases, Comments, Questions 514
(10th ed. 2002) (citing Leon v. State, 410 So. 2d 201 (Fla. App.1982)).
153.
See Leon v. State, 410 So. 2d 201, 203–05 (Fla App. 1982).
154.
Id. at 203–04.
155.
See Watkins v. State, 497 So. 2d 1153, 1157 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986); Andrade v.
State, 564 So. 2d 238, 239 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1990); Turner v. State, 423 So. 2d 594
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1982); Porter v. State, 410 So. 2d 164 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist.
1982); Porter v. State, 410 So. 2d 164, 169 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1982) (Fergusen, J.,
dissenting). I have omitted discussion of whether the citations were positive or negative because
it makes little difference to the question of whether the reasoning in Leon had impact and staying
power in case law. As the question is largely one of the laugh test, and whether it was imaginable
in criminal legal doctrine that circumstances could exist to excuse the use of physical coercion
of suspects, I am more interested in the extent to which judges felt this reasoning was worthy of
being addressed at all.
156.
Paul Marcus, A Return to the “Bright Line Rule” of Miranda, 35 Wm. & Mary L.
Rev.
93,
101
n.41
(1993);
Ada
Clapp,
The
Second
Circuit
Review—1988–1989 Term: Criminal Procedure: The Second Circuit Adopts a Clarification
Approach to Ambiguous Requests for Counsel: United States v. Gotay, 56 Brook. L. Rev. 511,
534 n.131 (1990); Irene Rosenberg & Yale Rosenberg, A Modest Proposal for the Abolition of
Custodial Confessions, 68 N.C. L. Rev. 69, 97 n.176 (1989); Roger Machlis, Criminal
Procedure II: The Privilege Against Self-incrimination, 1985 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 289 (1985);
Donald Dripps, Supreme Court Review: Foreword: Against Police Interrogation—And the
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 78 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 699, 721 n.89 (1988); Welsh
S. White, Defending Miranda: A Reply to Professor Caplan, 39 Vand. L. Rev. 1, 13 n.73 (1986);
Martin Gardner, The Emerging Good Faith Exception to the Miranda Rule—A Critique, 35
Hastings L.J. 429, 472 n.277 (1984).
157.
Kamisar, supra note 152; James Haddad et al., Criminal Procedure: Cases and
Comments (1987).
158.
Discourses and Practices of Terrorism: Interrogating Terror 53, 188, 192, 195 (Bob
Brecher et al. eds., 2010); Yuval Ginbar, Why Not Torture Terrorists?: Moral, Practical and
Legal Aspects of the “Ticking Bomb” Justification for Torture 319 n.233, 320 n.236 (2008);
James Acker et al., Criminal Procedure: A Contemporary Perspective 14–17, 99, 283, 300
(2004).
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seven scholarly articles,159 six discussing torture in the context of terrorism, as
well as one more state case.160 Leon v. Wainwright,161 the federal resolution of the
case, was cited in ten federal cases outside of the Eleventh Circuit,162 eight cases
within the Eleventh Circuit (including four federal appellate decisions), 163 six
state court decisions,164 and four journal articles by 2001.165 After 2001 it was
cited in another fourteen law journal articles (all but four explicitly refer to torture

159.
Kenneth Lasson, Torture, Truth Serum, and Ticking Bombs: Toward a Pragmatic
Perspective on Coercive Interrogation, 39 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 329, 353 n.100 (2008); John Cohan,
Torture and the Necessity Doctrine, 41 Val. U. L. Rev. 1587, 1603 n.71 (2007); Paul Marcus,
Seegers Lecture: It’s Not Just About Miranda: Determining the Voluntariness of Confessions in
Criminal Prosecutions, 40 Val. U. L. Rev. 601, 607 n.31 (2006); Mirko Bagaric & Julie Clarke,
The Torture Debate: Tortured Responses (A Reply to Our Critics): Physically Persuading
Suspects Is Morally Preferable to Allowing the Innocent to Be Murdered, 40 U.S.F. L. Rev. 703,
721 n.56 (2006); Marcy Strauss, Torture, 48 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 201, 240–41 nn.138–42 (2003);
Alan M. Dershowitz, The Torture Warrant: A Reply to Professor Strauss, 48 N.Y.L. Sch. L.
Rev. 275, 285 nn.48–49 (2003).
160.
People v. Richardson, 917 N.E.2d 501, 517 (Ill. 2009).
161.
734 F.2d 770 (11th Cir. 1984).
162.
United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1467 (10th Cir. 1993); Streetman v. Lynaugh,
812 F.2d 950, 957 (5th Cir. 1987); Vasquez v. Senkowski, 54 F. Supp. 2d 208, 217 (S.D.N.Y.
1999); United States v. Glover, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1649 (D. Kan. 1999); United States v.
Stewart, 51 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1146 (D. Kan. 1999); United States ex rel. Holland v. McGinnis,
754 F. Supp. 1245, 1258 (N.D. Ill. 1990); United States ex rel. Holland v. McGinnis, No. 90 C
04359, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15753 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 8, 1991); United States v. Rullo, 748 F.
Supp. 36, 41 (D. Mass. 1990); United States ex rel. Wilson v. O’Leary, 709 F. Supp. 837, 840
(N.D. Ill. 1989); United States ex rel. Wilson v. O’Leary, No. 87 C 6521, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14074 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 7, 1988).
163.
United States v. Mendoza-Cecelia, 963 F.2d 1467, 1475 (11th Cir. 1992); Harris v.
Dugger, 874 F.2d 756, 761 (11th Cir. 1989); United States v. Arango, 853 F.2d 818, 824 (11th
Cir. 1988); Smith v. Wainwright, 777 F.2d 609, 618 (11th Cir. 1985); Parker v. Turpin, 60 F.
Supp. 2d 1332, 1374 (N.D. Ga. 1999); United States v. Grimes, 911 F. Supp. 1485, 1498 (M.D.
Fla. 1996); Ferrell v. Davis, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16137, at *11 (S.D. Ala. Sept. 10, 1991);
Rutherford v. Davis, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16064, at *16 (S.D. Ala. Sept. 28, 1990).
164.
Johnson v. State, 696 So. 2d 326, 329 (Fla. 1997); State v. O’Hara, 627 A.2d 1001,
1004 (Me. 1993); Maqueira v. State, 588 So. 2d 221, 222 (Fla. 1991); Halberg v. State, 903 P.2d
1090, 1095 (Alaska Ct. App. 1995); People v. Douglas, 788 P.2d 640, 655 (Cal. 1990); Lee v.
State, 484 So. 2d 1180, 1184 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985).
165.
Project: Sixteenth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme
Court and Courts of Appeals 1985–1986: I. Investigation and Police Practices, 75 Geo. L.J.
713, 836 n.879 (1987); Lawrence Herman, The Supreme Court, the Attorney General, and the
Good Old Days of Police Interrogation, 48 Ohio St. L.J. 733, 754 n.156 (1987); Project:
Fifteenth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: United States Supreme Court and Courts of
Appeals 1984–1985, 74 Geo. L.J. 499, 607 n.800 (1986); Gregory K. Thoreson, Note, The
Compelled Confession: A Case Against Admissibility, 60 Notre Dame L. Rev. 800, 807 n.54
(1985).
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or human rights in their titles),166 four state cases,167 three Eleventh Circuit
cases,168 two federal cases in other circuits, 169 and one book.170
In the courts, citations of Leon and of the Eleventh Circuit case that came
out of it, generally ignore the question of the validity of use of force in Leon’s
first interrogation. Instead, judges cite the case primarily to support the decision
that police impropriety in early interrogations may be “cleaned” by the passage of
time, new interrogators, or other factors, in order to avoid “tainting” later
confessions.171
166.
Stephen Hoffman, Is Torture Justified in Terrorism Cases?: Comparing U.S. and
European Views, 33 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 379, 388–89 nn.59–64 (2013); Gregory McNeal, A Cup
of Coffee After the Waterboard: Seemingly Voluntary Post-Abuse Statements, 59 DePaul L. Rev.
943,
961
n.123,
963
nn.136–39 (2010); Symposium: Origins of Reasonable Doubt: Evidentiary Standards from
Christian Theology to Guantanamo: Evidence Gained from Torture: Wishful Thinking,
Checkability, and Extreme Circumstances, 17 Cardozo J. Int’l & Comp. L. 281 (2009); Cohan,
supra note 159; Lasson, supra note 159; Elizabeth Silker, Note, Terrorists, Interrogation, and
Torture: Where Do We Draw the Line?, 31 J. Legis. 191, 209 nn.150–53 (2004); Jeffrey
Addicott, Into the Star Chamber: Does the United States Engage in the Use of Torture or Similar
Illegal Practices in the War on Terror?, 92 Ky. L.J. 849, 888 nn.268–76 (2004); The Committee
on International Human Rights and The Committee on Military Affairs and Justice, Human
Rights Standards Applicable to the United States’ Interrogation of Detainees, 59 The Record
183, 207 n.59 (2004); Dershowitz, supra note 159; Strauss, supra note 159; Andrew Moher,
Note and Comment, The Lesser of Two Evils?: An Argument For Judicially Sanctioned Torture
in a Post-9/11 World, 26 T. Jefferson L. Rev. 469, 487 n.97 (2004); Welsh White, Confessions
in Capital Cases, 2003 U. Ill. L. Rev. 979, 988 n.51 (2003); Seth Kreimer, Too Close to the Rack
and Screw: Constitutional Constraints in the War on Terror, 6 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 278, 291 n.44
(2003); Susan Burger, Book Review, Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat,
Responding to the Challenge, 174 Mil. L. Rev. 189, 193 n.30 (2002).
167.
Hall v. State, 107 So. 3d 262, 271 (Fla. 2012); Ellington v. State, 735 S.E.2d 736,
747 (Ga. 2012); Braddy v. State, 111 So. 3d 810, 880 (Fla. 2012) (Quince, J. dissenting); State
v. Pulliam, 2012 Del. Super. LEXIS 545 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 13, 2012).
168.
United States v. Vickers, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127661 (M.D. Ala. Oct. 14, 2010);
United States v. Morante-Palacios, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45275 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 15, 2010);
United States v. Merrill, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11041 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 9, 2010).
169.
Carter v. Poole, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58674 (N.D.N.Y July 30, 2008); United
States v. Lopez, 437 F.3d 1059, 1067 (10th Cir. 2006).
170.
Alan M. Dershowitz, Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat,
Responding to the Challenge 124, 247 n.3, 253 (2002).
171.
United States v. Lopez, 437 F.3d 1059, 1067 (10th Cir. 2006) (distinguishing the
circumstances of that case from those in Leon); United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1467–68
(10th Cir. 1993) (quoting Leon’s statements concerning when a second confession will be
admissible when an earlier confession is not); United States v. Mendoza-Cecelia, 963 F.2d 1467,
1475 (11th Cir. 1992) (citing Leon to support the argument that a defendant’s second confession
will only be suppressed if it is tainted by the unconstitutional coercion used in an earlier
interrogation); Smith v. Wainwright, 777 F.2d 609, 618 (11th Cir. 1985); Carter v. Poole, 2008
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58674, at *46 (N.D.N.Y July 30, 2008) (enumerating factors to consider in
determining whether a confession has been tainted by earlier coercion); Vasquez v. Senkowski,
54 F. Supp. 2d 208, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (quoting Leon and Perdue on the issue of when a
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In contrast, Kamisar et al.’s reference to Leon and the acceptance of
police abuse in life-saving circumstances is not just citation, but suggestion. “Are
there (should there be) any limits on what a police officer may do to a suspected
kidnapper in order to get him to reveal the location of a kidnap victim?” the
textbook asks.172 It answers by referring to Leon, stating that the “use of police
threats and physical violence at the scene of arrest in order to ascertain the kidnap
victim’s whereabouts ‘did not constitutionally infect the later confessions.’”173
While the first edition’s discussion of Quarles included a counterexample,
suggesting that there may be limits on the interrogation of a suspect already
represented by counsel, later editions dropped this case in favor of a reference to
Pizzi’s 1985 article, which restates the kidnapping hypothetical and suggests,
again, that physical abuse might well be appropriate in such circumstances.174

second confession can be considered voluntary); United States v. Glover, No. 98-10059-01JWL, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1649, at *34–35 (D. Kan. Jan. 29, 1999) (quoting Perdue and Leon
on the issue of when a second confession is admissible); United States ex rel. Wilson v. O’Leary,
709 F.Supp. 837, 840 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (citing Leon for the statement that courts of appeals look
at whether the second confession was sufficiently attenuated from the earlier confession); United
States ex rel. Wilson v. O’Leary, No. 87 C 6521, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14074, at *3 (N.D. Ill.
Dec. 7, 1988) (citing Leon in determining that a second confession was admissible where the
circumstances were sufficiently different from the earlier interrogation); Watkins v. State, 497
So. 2d 1153, 1157 (Ala. Crim. App. 1986) (citing Leon in support of the decision to suppress
one of the defendant’s inculpatory statements but to admit a later statement); Lee v. State, 484
So. 2d 1180, 1184 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985) (citing Leon and other cases in enumerating the
significant factors in determining whether a later statement is admissible); People v. Douglas,
788 P.2d 640, 655 (Cal. 1990) (citing Leon in determining that the circumstances of the second
confession were sufficiently distinct); State v. Pulliam, I.D. No. 1112006547A, 2012 Del. Super.
LEXIS 545, at *26 n.65 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 13, 2012) (citing Leon and other cases in
enumerating the factors to consider in deciding whether a second confession is valid); Braddy
v. State, 111 So. 3d 810, 880 (Fla. 2012) (Quince, J. dissenting) (distinguishing the case from
Leon and arguing that the defendant’s second confession was not admissible); Andrade v. State,
564 So. 2d 238, 239 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1990) (citing Leon and other cases supporting
the determination that the defendant’s incriminating statements were unrelated to earlier
physical and verbal abuse by different police officers); Ellington v. State, 735 S.E.2d 736, 747
(Ga. 2012) (quoting Leon’s statement that a second confession is admissible if there has been a
“sufficiently isolating break in the stream of events”); People v. Richardson, 917 N.E.2d 501,
517 (Ill. 2009) (citing Leon to support the proposition that a confession is not inadmissible when
it is sufficiently distinct from earlier coercion); State v. O’Hara, 627 A.2d 1001, 1004 (Me. 1993)
(citing Leon in stating that a witness’s prior involuntary statement does not preclude admission
of a later voluntary statement).
172.
Kamisar, supra note 149, at 539.
173.
Id.
174.
Id.; Yale Kamisar et al., Modern Criminal Procedure: Cases, Comments, Questions
505 (7th ed. 1990) (citing People v. Knapp, 441 N.E.2d 1057 (N.Y. 1982)); Kamisar, supra note
140,
at
539
(“‘There
are
due
process
limits . . . even where life is at stake’ but ‘[i]n determining those limits [the] traditional scope of
police conduct permitted . . . is only a starting point.’”). Note that even the limitation on abuse
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This article was cited again in another line of textbooks, apparently instead of
reference to Leon and Krom.175 Indeed, no textbook responded to this question
with case law or scholarship contradicting Leon, Krom, or Quarles. Where the
question was asked, it was uniformly answered in the affirmative. 176
The Quarles reasoning (and particularly the dissent, referring to the
threat of bombs, which was included in three of the five most commonly used
textbooks, including both of the two most commonly used books177) offers a clear
hole in the prohibition on coercive interrogation, suggesting that in extreme cases
any level of abuse may be acceptable. The notion that even extreme abuse may be
acceptable in extreme circumstances gained force as it was specifically
highlighted by textbooks, and as textbooks offered further support for the
suggestion in the form of at least one court and one legal scholar.178
Where the textbooks recognize limits to the amount of abuse authorized
by Quarles, they do so by referring back to the older limits of voluntariness and
due process limitations.179 Yet this creates circular reasoning, eventually leading
back to the allowance of brutality, because these limitations (themselves quite
weak, as discussed below) are influenced as well by the kidnapping/ticking time
bomb reasoning of Quarles.

C. Shocking the Conscience, Specific Intent, and Cruel and Unusual
Punishment
One of John Yoo’s most shocking claims, and perhaps most ridiculous
as well, is that brutal treatment cannot be torture if motivated by a desire to apply
only enough pain to get information, rather than a specifically sadistic desire to
is given in the context of due process violations, an analysis which returns to the question of the
size of the government interest at stake. For further discussion, see infra Part III(c).
175.
Welsh White & James Tomkovicz, Criminal Procedure: Constitutional Constraints
upon Investigation and Proof 538 (4th ed. 2001); Welsh White & James Tomkovicz, Criminal
Procedure: Constitutional Constraints upon Investigation and Proof 488 (3d ed. 1998); Welsh
White & James Tomkovicz, Criminal Procedure: Constitutional Constraints upon Investigation
and Proof 561 (2d ed. 1994); Welsh White & James Tomkovicz, Criminal Procedure:
Constitutional Constraints upon Investigation and Proof 507 (1st ed. 1990).
176.
One series of textbooks did not broach the question directly, but did follow its
discussion of Quarles with a reiteration of due process and voluntariness requirements, and the
suggestion that threats of physical violence might breach these limits. Saltzburg & Capra, supra
note 142, at 497.
177.
Kamisar, supra note 140; Ronald Allen et al., Comprehensive Criminal Procedure
836 (2001); White & Tomkovicz (3d ed. 1998), supra note 175, at 487–88.
178.
Leon v. Wainwright, 734 F.2d 770 (11th Cir. 1984); Pizzi, supra note 121.
179.
See, e.g., Saltzburg & Capra, supra note 146 (“[T]he confession itself can be
admitted if obtained under emergency circumstances . . . . However . . . the due process
involuntariness test retains vitality today.” (internal citations omitted)). In Allen et al.’s
casebook, the Quarles case is included within a section on “voluntariness reconsidered.” Allen,
supra note 177, at 828–37.
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apply a torturous level of pain to a victim. 180 The notion is belied by the fact that
torture in the context of interrogation is specifically enumerated as one of the
types of torture banned under the Convention Against Torture (CAT),181 and
torture in order to force a confession is specifically envisioned by the Torture
Victim Protection Act of 1991 (passed by Congress in order to enact CAT).182
Yet Daniel Levin echoes this logic, when he states that severe pain and
suffering should be “the conscious desire” of the torturer.183 Bradbury states the
same.184 The two agree that individuals who act in good faith believe “that [their]
conduct would not be expected to inflict severe physical or mental pain or
suffering . . . would not have the specific intent necessary to violate [the federal
statute prohibiting torture].”185

180.

Yoo I Memo, supra note 99, at 4.
[E]ven if the defendant knows that severe pain will result from his actions,
if causing such harm is not his objective, he lacks the requisite specific
intent . . . [A] defendant is guilty of torture only if he acts with the express
purpose of inflicting severe pain or suffering on a person.
It was so well accepted that this was a claim that applying only enough pressure to get vital
information from the victim would not be torture, that the claim was specifically discredited in
Daniel Levin’s December 2004 memorandum. Memorandum from Levin, supra note 104, at 17
(“[A] defendant’s motive (to protect national security, for example) is not relevant to the
question whether he has acted with the requisite specific intent under the statute.”). Still, Levin
held to the notion that a torturous level of pain must be the “conscious desire” of the defendant,
undermining his disavowal of Yoo’s logic. Id. at 16–17; see also infra note 183 and
accompanying text.
181.
The Convention Against Torture defines torture as “any act by which severe pain
or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes
as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession.” Convention against Torture
and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 1, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465
U.N.T.S. 85, available at http://www.hrweb.org/legal/cat.html.
182.
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102–256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992)
(codified as note following 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2014)). The Act included a definition of torture
adopting the language of the Convention Against Torture, so that torture includes, “any act . . .
by which severe pain or suffering . . . is intentionally inflicted on [an] individual for such
purposes as obtaining from that individual or a third person information or a confession.” 28
U.S.C. §1350 note 3(b)(1) (1992).
183.
Memorandum from Levin, supra note 104, at 16.
184.
Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen.,
Office of Legal Counsel, to John Rizzo, Acting Gen. Counsel, CIA, Re: Application of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2340-2340A to Certain Techniques That May Be Used in the Interrogation of a High Value
al
Qaeda
Detainee
27
(May
10,
2005),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/legacy/2013/10/21/memo-bradbury2005-3.pdf
(discussing the meaning of “specifically intended”) [hereinafter Memorandum from Steven
Bradbury, May 10, 2005].
185.
Memorandum from Daniel Levin, supra note 104, at 17; see Memorandum from
Steven Bradbury, May 10, 2005, supra note 184, at 28 (“[I]f an individual acted in good faith,
and only after reasonable investigation establishing that his conduct would not be expected to
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It is true that, between the torturer who acts believing he will not cause
a torturous level of pain, and the torturer who acts with the conscious desire to
cause that pain with no higher motive driving him, there is the “knowing” torturer
who, possibly reluctantly, engages in behavior he knows will cause torturous
levels of pain, but only for some higher purpose. Post-Yoo memo authors, through
avoidance of legal analysis, carefully protect the status of this individual. The
situation is expressly avoided in the Levin memo, which discusses contradicting
legal analyses regarding knowledge of harm as related to specific intent, and
concludes that it would not be “useful to try to define the precise meaning of
‘specific intent’ in [the torture statute].”186 Bradbury’s May 10, 2005 memo
echoes Levin’s analysis, as well as his refusal to draw a conclusion regarding such
defendants.187
In 2005, it became clear that the Department of Justice’s reasoning was
that torture must be sadistic; it must be cruel. Bradbury’s May 30, 2005 memo
expands the prior analyses of motive, while arguing that the CIA techniques could
not be considered cruel, inhuman, and degrading (a standard generally considered
to be less abusive than torture). Here, Bradbury relies on the criminal legal
doctrine requiring that behavior “shock the conscience” in order to qualify as cruel
and unusual.188 This is also the outer boundary of violations of due process—a
due process violation is found to have occurred only when the behavior of police
officers “shock the conscience.”189
Like Yoo, Bradbury notes that the United States specifically limited its
adherence under CAT to behavior that falls under domestic legal standards of
cruel and unusual punishment.190 Like Yoo, Bradbury finds that these legal
standards set an incredibly high bar—specifically one of arbitrariness—where
punishment is cruel for cruelty’s sake, rather than for any legitimate governmental
purpose, such as obtaining direly needed information. 191
The reiteration of this logic suggests that it was not as
far-fetched as critics suggest.192 As other scholars have noted, by 2005 the “shock
inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering, he would not have the specific intent
necessary to violate sections 2340-2340A.”).
186.
Memorandum from Daniel Levin, supra note 104, at 16.
187.
See Memorandum from Steven Bradbury, May 10, 2005, supra note 184, at 27–28.
188.
Memorandum from Steven Bradbury, May 30, 2005, supra note 104, at 2–3.
189.
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 175 (1952); County of Sacramento v. Lewis,
523 U.S. 833, 855 (1998).
190.
See Memorandum from Steven Bradbury, May 30, 2005, supra note 104, at 16.
191.
See id. at 27–28.
192.
For arguments that the Department of Justice’s reasoning was swayed by improper
influences and offered an inaccurate analysis, as well as a sudden and severe deviation from
accepted legal doctrine, see, e.g., Cole, supra note 60 (arguing that the memos show evidence
of a desire to insulate torturers from prosecution); Mark Danner, The Twilight of Responsibility:
Torture and the Higher Deniability, 49 Houston L. Rev. 71, 79 (2012) (finding the memos
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the conscience” standard—used to evaluate violations of the prohibition on cruel
and unusual punishment as well as due process requirements—had long devolved
into one that seemingly allowed absolutely any brutal treatment as long as some
governmental interest could be cited in justification. 193 Under this jurisprudence,
liability will not be found to exist unless officials are malicious, sadistic, or
deliberately indifferent.194 In other words, any amount of pain can be justified,
based on a need to protect the public, or the official himself.
As John Parry195 and Jerry Skolnick196 point out, the extreme evolution
of the “shock the conscience” test was illustrated in the case of Chavez v.
Martinez.197 That case, which arose in 1997 but was decided in 2003 before torture
had reached the public eye, concerned the hospital interrogation of a crime suspect
who had been shot several times, including in the face. The interrogation is
memorialized in an audiotape, wherein the listener can plainly hear the suspect
begging for the interrogation to stop and for a doctor to be brought in, as well as
screaming, apparently in pain. 198

dishonest and lacking credibility); Tung Yin, Great Minds Think Alike: The “Torture Memo,”
Office of Legal Counsel, and Sharing the Boss’s Mindset, 45 Willamette L. Rev. 473 (2009)
(arguing that the memos are flawed due to a desire to please a supervisor); David Luban, Legal
Ethics and Human Dignity 176–80, 200–02 (2007) (describing legal ethics, the obligation to
accurately state the law, and the failure of the Office of Legal Counsel to do so with respect to
the question of torture); Frederick Schwarz Jr. & Aziz Huq, Unchecked and Unbalanced:
Presidential Powers in a Time of Terror (2007) (describing why the Bush Administration’s legal
analyses were “embarrassingly wrong”); W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics and the Separation
of Law and Morals, 91 Cornell L. Rev. 67, 68 (2005) (“This is not legal analysis of which anyone
could be proud.”).
193.
See Dayan, supra note 6; see generally John Parry, “Just for Fun:” Understanding
Torture and Understanding Abu Ghraib, 1 J. Nat. Sec. L. & Pol’y 253 (2005) (arguing that the
“law in fact fails to regulate torture”); John Parry, Constitutional Interpretation, Coercive
Interrogation, and Civil Rights Litigation after Chavez v. Martinez, 39 Ga. L. Rev. 733 (2005)
(describing the “shock the conscience” standard as vague).
194.
See Parry, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 193; see also Whitley v. Albers,
475 U.S. 312, 320–21 (1986) (holding that whether force used to quell violence in prison
violated the Eighth Amendment depended on whether it was applied “maliciously and
sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm”); Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 775
(2003) (holding that whether force used in interrogating a witness violated the Eighth
Amendment depended on whether the force was “unjustifiable by any government interest”).
195.
See Parry, Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 193.
196.
See Skolnick, supra note 113.
197.
Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003).
198.
Id. at 784. Justice Stevens’ opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part,
includes an excerpt of the transcript, including, “Ay! What are you doing to me! No . . . !
[unintelligible scream].” The suspect, Oliverio Martinez, was never tried for any crime, but he
did sue the officer involved for violating his constitutional right against self-incrimination. Id.
at 764–65. Because he had not been charged with a crime, however, the Supreme Court found
that he had no self-incrimination right to be violated. The brutality of the interrogation might
have been a violation of due process, but the case had not been brought on that basis. Id. at 766
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In dicta, six justices addressed the question of whether Martinez’s due
process rights had been violated. Three of the justices specifically stated there was
no such violation—as such a violation required conduct that is “unjustifiable by
any government interest”.199 In other words, brutality was acceptable if it was
necessary to fulfill some legitimate goal of government. Here, these justices found
that the government’s interest in determining whether or not “there had been
police misconduct constituted a justifiable government interest” because of the
emergency situation in which the police found themselves. Had Martinez died
before talking to police, evidence would have been irrevocably lost. 200 Only three
justices bothered to suggest that loss of evidence might not justify the type of
violence the audiotape suggests.201
In a brief for Chavez written in 2002, before the torture memos were
complete or the use of torture by U.S. government agents had become a public
scandal, the government cited Quarles as part of its argument that death threats,
“grabbing of the throat,” (a clear reference to Leon) and threats of physical abuse
would be justifiable if a bomb were “about to explode” and the police were
“seeking life-saving information.”202 At oral arguments, the amount of abuse
possible ascended to the level of beating a suspect with a rubber hose. 203
In fact, the ubiquity of the Quarles precedent highlights just how central
that precedent and the public safety exception were to the question of police
brutality in interrogating witnesses, and how well acknowledged that centrality
was. Not only was the precedent discussed at oral arguments and relied on by the
government, but also lawyers for Martinez cited the case and Leon v. Wainright.204
This suggests that the public safety narrative was not merely the product of a
desperate search for precedent, but was also an accepted aspect of U.S. law.
The split in Chavez regarding these questions suggests that the
prohibition on using physical abuse to obtain evidence in a situation where time
is of the essence was up for debate in 2002 and 2003. It is precisely this
interpretation that forms the basis of the Bradbury memo, and it is for this reason
(“We fail to see how . . . Martinez can allege a violation of [the Fifth Amendment], since
Martinez was never prosecuted for a crime . . . .”).
199.
Id. at 775.
200.
Id.
201.
Id. at 787–88 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 796–99
(Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Ginsburg joined the relevant
portions of Justice Kennedy’s opinion. Id. at 799 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). See also Parry, “Just for Fun,” supra note 193, at 273 (discussing the limited support
in the Supreme Court for the notion that Martinez’s interrogation violated due process).
202.
Seth Kreimer, Torture Lite, Full-Bodied Torture, and the Insulation of Legal
Conscience, 1 J. Nat. Sec. L. & Policy 87, 206 n. 72 (2005).
203.
Oral Argument, Chavez, 538 U.S. 760 (No. 01-1444), available at
http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2002/2002_01_1444.
204.
Brief for the Petitioner at 27, 31, Chavez, 538 U.S. 760 (No. 01-1444).
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that Bradbury discusses extensively the governmental interest in using brutal
tactics to interrogate detainees. Bradbury describes the imminence and magnitude
of the threat that interrogators (supposedly) encountered before resorting to these
methods, and the care interrogators (supposedly) used in applying the
techniques.205 Relying on the “shocks the conscience” standard, Bradbury makes
his case that the CIA’s methods were not cruel and unusual, because they were
called for in order to fulfill legitimate governmental interests. 206 Indeed, Bradbury
cites Chavez, claiming it was a more extreme interrogation than that planned by
the CIA and suggesting that the Supreme Court found it was justified.207 Bradbury
also highlights how much more legitimate the government’s national security
interest must be Bradbury is not alone in thinking that the Chavez case illustrates
just how low due process standards had sunk by the time of that decision. Legal
scholars analyzing the application of the “shocks the conscience” test in Fifth and
Eighth Amendment doctrines come to similar conclusions 208 as does my own
analysis above.
The connection made by the government, both in the Chavez case and in
Bradbury’s memo citing Chavez, between the legitimacy of brutal tactics and the
search for vital information is precisely the connection made not only in Quarles,
but in Krom, and Leon. Those cases similarly relied upon the notion that rather
than an illegitimate purpose, namely seeking a confession, police were acting
towards a legitimate government interest, seeking information.
Indeed, the “shocks the conscience” limitation to “unjustifiable based on
any governmental interest” is inherently connected to a division between the
reactive and preventive functions of law enforcement. Actions that would be
unacceptable as “punishment” (i.e., in the words of Leon, the “secondary role” of
police that commences once a crime is completed and danger is past) are
unquestioned as part of ongoing efforts to prevent future harms.

D. Doctrine, Torture, and the Logic of Prevention
I have already discussed how the logic of the ticking
time-bomb scenario replicates the preventive logic of the precautionary principle,
but it is worth noting the workings of the logic of prevention and the precautionary
principle in the language of the courts and the textbooks themselves.

205.
206.
207.

208.

Memorandum from Steven Bradbury, May 30, 2005, supra note 104, at 29–30.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 33.
The CIA program is considerably less invasive than much of the conduct
at issue in these cases. In addition, the government interest . . . at stake
here: the national security—in particular, the protection of the United
States . . . against attacks that may result in massive civilian casualties.
See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
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The precautionary principle is particularly evident in the discussion of
kidnapping, and the removal of defendants’ protections in such cases. The cases
discussed above offer varying levels of intrusion on defendants’ rights and
varying levels of danger presented to the victim in the case. But the judges
universally agree that, in a kidnapping case, no investigation into the level of
threat presented is necessary. 209 Instead, kidnapping qualifies as a type of crime
that carries with it an immeasurable risk of high-level damage. Judges do not
know, and do not ask, how likely it is that this kidnapper will kill this victim.
Kidnappers sometimes kill their victims. Therefore, there is a known high-level
risk, which makes analysis of its likelihood unnecessary.210
In each of these cases police officers had good reason to believe they had
a suspect with valuable information, with evidence ranging from the defendant
stating he “might know something about it”211 to the apprehension of the suspect
in the middle of a ransom transaction. 212 But discussion of how much evidence is
available is considered unnecessary to the broader ruling. Judges consider it
sufficient to look at the evidence available (in the hindsight of reviewing a
defendant who has confessed and whose confession has been corroborated) and
state broadly that a life was in danger, without providing a concluding sentence
that police officers had sufficient evidence to believe they had the offender in
custody.
Here, again, we see the disappearance of the question of law enforcement
evaluations. The risk that emergency exceptions might pose to innocent suspects
is not worthy of consideration, even where (as in Krom) judges appear conscious
of the fact that they are creating or extending an exception to procedure that will
carry forward into other cases.
It is also worth noting that judges place these determinations squarely
within the rubric of preventive criminal justice. In Krom, for instance, Judge
Wachtler prioritized the preventive role of policing, stating that preventing crime
was “a primary role of the police,” whereas apprehending suspects and gathering
evidence was merely “secondary.”213 In Dean,214 Krom,215 and, notably, Leon,
judges emphasized that the purpose of the interrogation, and brutality in the case
209.
See supra notes 124–136 and accompanying text.
210.
It is once again worth noting the comparison to the case of the use of preventive
solitary confinement of terrorists. There, as well, judges no longer bother to examine how likely
individual defendants are to engage in the harm of which they are assumed to be capable. The
mere fact that they are prosecuted for a certain type of crime that is associated with a high level
of harm is sufficient to preventively detain them in the harshest conditions known in the criminal
justice system.
211.
People v. Krom, 61 N.Y.2d 187, 193–94 (1984).
212.
Leon, 410 So. 2d 201 (Fla. App. 1982).
213.
Krom, 61 N.Y.2d at 198.
214.
People v. Dean, 114 Cal. Rptr. 555 (Cal. App. 1974).
215.
Krom, 61 N.Y.2d at 198.
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of Leon, was not to get a confession, but to save a life. 216 In other words, the
exception to the defendants’ protections was based on the fact that the purpose
was not to gather evidence, but to prevent future harm from occurring.
It is true that, other than Leon, these cases approved of purely procedural
violations rather than physical abuse. However, this distinction disappeared as the
cases moved into the realm of criminal procedure textbooks. There, the “public
safety,” “rescue,” and/or “emergency” exceptions referenced the possibility that
physical abuse might well be tolerable (in some textbooks more heavily than in
others).
Moreover, the omission of questions of the accuracy of police beliefs
regarding the possible harm and the suspect’s guilt, and questions of the level of
necessity of this interrogation in order to acquire the information, is even starker
in textbooks. In fact, Kamisar et al. make no reference to the possibility that a
suspect might be innocent, or that a life may not actually be at stake. “Should
statements obtained in violation of Miranda be admissible if police interrogation
of a suspected kidnapper is motivated primarily by a desire to save the victim’s
life?” they ask, just prior to asking about the limits of those interrogations. 217 That
the interrogation should, and will, occur is supported by case law and
scholarship.218 While it is true that at times the cases are not described, the case
law cited consists of precisely those cases that similarly ignored the question of
innocence.219 No opposing answer is given. Should a student choose to consider
whether or not these violations are permissible, he or she will be directed towards
an answer that the interrogation is proper, with no complication, debate, or doubts.
The book goes on to discuss the possible limits of the extent of the
interrogations.220 The questions of whether the victim’s life is in danger, whether
the suspect is guilty, and how certain police are of those facts, are completely
omitted. This structures students’ thought processes to look to questions of degree,
rather than propriety, and to skip over doubts regarding whether any original
(completely ignored) ignorance may be a concern. Motivation “by a desire to save
the victim’s life” is sufficient, with no question as to the facts, or assumptions,
underlying that desire. Moreover, the fact that the kidnapper is only “suspected”
is quickly glossed over.
In each of these ways, the precautionary principle shows its hold on U.S.
criminal legal doctrine, and its reach into limitations on the treatment of persons
suspected of having (possibly) life-saving information. The primary interest at
stake is one of prevention of future harm. It is known that the future harm might
216.
Leon v. State, 410 So. 2d at 203; see also Leon v. Wainwright, 734 F.2d 770, 773
(11th Cir. 1984) (describing the purpose of the interrogation).
217.
Kamisar, supra note 174, at 505.
218.
Id.
219.
Id.
220.
Id.
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be large, but its actual likelihood is unknown and irrelevant. The status of the
suspect and the accuracy of the belief that he has relevant information are
sufficiently irrelevant to be largely undiscussed. His moral guilt, which in other
circumstances would be the basis for imposing upon his freedom, is irrelevant in
light of the (possible but not definite) harm to be prevented.
The evolution of the “shocks the conscience” standard shows the reach
of the logic of prevention in criminal justice. While the most direct connection to
the discourse of the ticking time bomb and the protection of public safety can be
found in exceptions to Miranda, the logic is clearly present in other areas of
criminal law and procedure. Typically, the use of torture in criminal justice would
fall under a due process violation, rather than Miranda, as a violation in its own
right. The Chavez discussion and the limitation of this protection to solely those
violations that are done for purposes other than prevention attest to the
prioritization of prevention.

IV. CONCLUSION: THE CRIMINAL ROOTS AND
CRIMINAL FUTURE OF TORTURE
The malleable and indeterminate nature of the law is well accepted in
socio-legal scholarship.221 Particularly in times of extreme duress, the popular
assumption is that law will have no force in the face of political will. The use of
torture by the United States since 2001 is often discussed in this context as an
example of the failure of legal norms, legal institutions, and the rule of law. In the
wake of the terror attacks of 2001, it is claimed, “the unthinkable became
thinkable,”222 and all prior norms were abandoned.
But the above analysis demonstrates that torture was not nearly as
unthinkable as these critics would like to believe. To the contrary, the
circumstances in which torture would be acceptable was a subject of ongoing
debate and consideration in the realm of criminal procedure. Nor was this debate
limited to a few outlier judges, discussing scenarios they believed would never
arise. To the contrary, it was present in the education of law students at schools
across the country, and in cases that arose, seemingly, with some regularity.
Most importantly, the notion of accepting torture in one of these
circumstances was not presented as a ridiculous suggestion, to be rejected as far

221.
See, e.g., Martin Shapiro, Courts: A Comparative and Political Analysis (1981)
(arguing that courts, and therefore law, are influenced by political pressures); Judith Resnik,
Managerial Judges, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 374 (1982) (explaining how judges are not distanced from
cases but actively engage with litigants, and their rulings are influenced by those interactions as
well as the law); Donald Black, Sociological Justice (1989) (arguing that law is a social process,
influenced by social characteristics of judges and lawyers as well as litigants).
222.
Jeremy Waldron, Torture, Terror, and Trade-Offs: Philosophy for the White House
222 (2010).
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outside of the realms of legal limits. Instead, cases that were accepting of the use
of physical abuse in order to obtain information in circumstances where a single
life might be at stake were presented as accepted doctrine, thereby creating the
assumption that an exception might be made in such a circumstance.
The clearly preventive nature of the use of torture, and the preventive
reasoning that was presented in cases and in textbooks to justify its use, as well as
its appearance in standard criminal procedure debates, suggest that this logic was
an outgrowth of the preventive turn in criminal law and procedure that began in
the late 20th century. This suggestion has broad ramifications for scholars studying
the use of torture and activists seeking to prevent it.
Since 2001, the use of torture has been justified, consistently, in reliance
on the exceptional nature of the threat of terrorism. There appears to be wide
agreement that torture, if used, should only be used in extreme circumstances. 223
Among proponents of the use of torture the argument is that the threat of terrorism
fits these circumstances. Indeed this is the very point of the ticking time-bomb
hypothetical. In response, critics of the use of torture have focused on this
hypothetical scenario as well, pointing to its flaws, suggesting that it is based on
assumptions of facts that rarely, if ever, occur in real life, and arguing that it fails
as a philosophical justification for torture, for those reasons.
But the fact that justifications for torture originated in conventional
criminal procedure shows the mistake of allowing the argument to be framed as a
response to terrorism in the first place. In fact, the ticking time-bomb is merely a
version of an earlier criminal procedural thought experiment. Far from
exceptional reasoning, requiring “mission creep”224 to make its way into
conventional criminal process, the use of torture is the realization of criminal
procedural theory. Acceptance in criminal procedure is therefore not nearly so far
off.
Pigeonholing the discussion of torture in the context of terrorism has the
same result as the ticking time bomb hypothetical itself does—it assumes that the
question will arise only in the most extreme cases, where (as was the case, in the
minds of government actors in the spring of 2002)225 there is some ultimate threat
223.
See, e.g., Paul Gronke et al., U.S. Public Opinion on Torture,
2001–2009, 43 Pol. Sci. & Pol. 437 (2010) (discussing public opinion polls on torture); see also
Mark Danner, US Torture: Voices from the Black Sites, New York Review of Books, Apr. 9,
2009, at 1, 23 (“Polls tend to show that a majority of Americans are willing to support torture
only when they are assured that it will ‘thwart a terrorist attack.’”).
224.
See, e.g., F.A.O. Schwartz, Jr., The Church Committee, Then and Now, in U.S.
National Security, Intelligence, and Democracy: From the Church Committee to the War on
Terror 22, 26 (Russell A. Miller ed. 2008) (warning of the risk of “mission creep,” the
progression of intelligence activities against military or intelligence targets to use of those
activities against civilians).
225.
See 60 Minutes: Hard Measures (CBS television broadcast Apr. 29, 2012),
available at http://www.cbsnews.com/news/hard-measures-ex-cia-head-defends-post-9-11-
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of nuclear weapons and at the very least multiple lives lost.226 This ignores the
discussion of torture that is already ongoing in the federal courts and legal
classrooms across the country, that reaches to circumstances where there is a
possible (unconfirmed) threat to a single life, where police are acting on
conventional detective work rather than overwhelming evidence provided by
foreign intelligence surveillance, where all the normal caveats related to police
behavior and government fallibility can and should apply.
This does not contradict the criticisms lodged against the ticking timebomb hypothetical, that government intelligence may still be wrong, and that there
is no way to know all the important factors that are presumed to be known in the
hypothetical. Rather it exemplifies these criticisms. Allowing the discussion to
remain in the context of the threat of terror allows scholars and the public to rely
on the belief that multiple steps along the slippery slope will be necessary before
we reach the application of this reasoning to conventional crime. This reliance is
unfounded. We are already down the slippery slope. The discussion on allowing
torture in conventional criminal cases is well underway and has been for decades.
For example, in May of this year, an article was written citing a government
source who claimed that “the world’s most notorious drug lord” had been found
in December of 2013 by torturing a number of his subordinates. 227
Indeed, it seems it was this discussion that created the narrative that
eventually justified the use of torture. This is an important point for those who are
intent on eradicating the use of torture. If the prohibition on torture is to become
truly absolute, it is in the conventional criminal domain that we must guard against
exceptions and allowances for its use. A prohibition in the realm of international
law will mean very little if our norms in the domestic sphere offer outlets and
justifications for the use of torture. It may be wise, rather than guarding against
the use of torture in exceptional circumstances, to more quickly credit the threat
of the slippery slope in the everyday world of criminal justice norms. It is to these
norms that our imagination jumps when the exceptional circumstance appears.

tactics/; see also Jay S. Bybee, Classified Response to the U.S. Department of Justice Office of
Professional Responsibility 15 (2009), available at https://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/oprbybeefinal.pdf (describing the belief of the intelligence community that hundreds of American
lives would be lost if interrogations did not continue).
226.
Of course, basing a justification of torture on the loss of multiple lives leaves one
to wonder whether similar measures would be justified in order to prevent, for instance, school
shootings or other mass killing events.
227.
Patrick R. Keefe, The Hunt for El Chapo: How the World’s Most Notorious Drug
Lord
was
Captured,
New
Yorker,
May
5,
2014,
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/05/05/the-hunt-for-el-chapo?currentPage=allNew
(suggesting that information had come from informants who had been tortured by Mexican
authorities).
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APPENDIX A:
Most Adopted Criminal Procedure Textbooks, 2003, in order of
common usage, highest to lowest (from Bibas, 2003):
ADOPTIONS | TEXT
56
YALE KAMISAR ET AL., MODERN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: CASES, COMMENTS AND
QUESTIONS
(2000)
40
WELSH S. WHITE & JAMES J. TOMKOVICZ,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSTRAINTS UPON INVESTIGATION AND
PROOF (2001)
38
NEIL P. COHEN & DONALD J. HALL, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: THE POST-INVESTIGATIVE
PROCESS CASES AND MATERIALS (2000)
37
STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA,
AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES AND
COMMENTARY (2000)
35
RONALD JAY ALLEN, WILLIAM STUNTZ, JOSEPH
HOFFMANN, DEBRA LIVINGSTON, & ANDREW
LEIPOLD, COMPREHENSIVE CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE (2001)
34
MARC L. MILLER & RONALD F. WRIGHT,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURES: CASES, STATUTES,
AND EXECUTIVE MATERIALS (1998)
34
JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS, III,
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES, POLICIES
AND PERSPECTIVES (1999)
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